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West Europe Report



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POLL DISCOVERS INCREASING OPPOSITION TO NATO MISSILES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Jul 84 p 5

[Text] The solid opposition to deployment of new nuclear missiles in West Europe has remained constant at 58 percent during the last year, while 21 percent favored deployment.

Even among NATO supporters the dislike of deployment is widespread and only voters who think the balance of power was decisively changed in favor of the Soviet Union with the deployment of the SS-20 missiles approve deployment of missiles in West Europe.

This appears from the latest survey the Gallup Institute carried out on the missile issue.

The poll repeated one made a year ago and a representative selection of voters made up of around 1,000 respondents was asked the following questions:

"The Soviet Union has installed new and improved nuclear missiles that are capable of striking West Europe. That is the reason given for installing new improved nuclear missiles in West Europe. Do you think it is correct to say that West Europe will be seriously weakened compared to the Soviet Union if it does not install improved nuclear missiles in West Europe?

"Regardless of whether or not the balance of strength is changed, do you think the improved nuclear missiles should be installed or do you think they should not be installed?"

Answers to the first question were as follows compared to the 1983 poll:

<u>Answer</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
NATO seriously weakened	41%	35%
NATO not seriously weakened	35	37
Don't know	24	29
Total	100%	100%

An important NATO argument for deploying the new missiles has been that the SS-20 missiles meant a substantial weakening of West European defense. This argument was accepted in 1983, but now as the table shows only a relative plurality (37 compared to 35 percent) believes that the SS-20 missiles do not substantially weaken West European defense.

Acceptance of Missiles Declines

The significance of this could be that acceptance of the new missiles has declined even more, which appears from the following table giving responses to the second question:

<u>Answer</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
For missile deployment	24%	21%
Against missile deployment	58	58
Don't know	18	18 [as published]

As we can see, opposition has remained at a constant level of 58 percent while the number of voters accepting deployment declined from 24 to 21 percent.

The poll also showed that even among NATO supporters a plurality opposed deployment (47 to 36 percent). Only among voters who think the Russian SS-20 missiles decisively changed the military balance of power in favor of the Russians was there a majority in favor of deploying the new missiles in West Europe (52 to 38 percent).

(Reproduction permitted if BERLINGSKE TIDENDE and the Gallup Institute are listed as sources.)

6578

CSO: 3613/196

PAPER COMMENTS ON END OF POLITICAL SEASON: SDP IN RETREAT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Jun 84 p 12

[Editorial: "Holiday Spirit"]

[Text] Which political party is having the most difficult time? Who is it that must spend their summer months worrying about what will happen when the political work begins once again?

You might think it would be the government and its four parties that will be unable to enjoy the summer vacation and will feel shivers even as they lie on the beach in the broiling sun. After all, it is a government that is in a permanent minority and that, throughout the years, has been under tremendous pressure from the opposition. Even though the government has had the wind in its sails, it certainly has enough problems to think about. But it is not Poul Schluter or his party, nor is it the Liberal Party, the Center-Democratic Party, nor the Christian People's Party that will have a difficult time enjoying the summer. On the contrary, they are entering the summer months encouraged by the elections to the EC parliament. Nor is it the Radical Liberals who are worried. When it comes down to it, they are pleased with the balance of power in parliament that has made them important and they are happy to utilize this position once more. The Socialist People's Party is also in a good mood after the European elections. Who is it, then, who is having trouble? Strangely enough, it is the Social Democrats who are trying in vain to capture the holiday spirit. History tells us that it should be the large opposition party that is feeling best.

The Social Democrats are hanging their heads for several reasons. They are disgruntled because the government they viewed as a fleeting, soon-to-be forgotten intermezzo has proven to be capable of lasting much longer than they ever imagined. The Social Democrats have had to admit that they have played their opposition role poorly. This has created numerous problems for them with the government and with the public. They also have had to admit openly that, during these years, they also have had problems with themselves. The freedom from government responsibility has meant that they are no longer in control of their parliamentary group or their party. There is often disagreement within the parliamentary group that must be settled by the executive committee. When

the party congress is held after the summer vacation, the leftist forces within the party will certainly attempt to force decisions that will make the party's day-to-day life even more difficult. This may help the government make a quick deal with the Social Democrats on defense policy. This could also be useful for those Social Democratic politicians who fear what might happen if an agreement on foreign and defense policy is made only after the holidays.

Just imagine Social Democrats who are unable to enjoy their vacation!

9336

CSO: 3613/186

BRIEFS

GUEST WORKER PROBLEM DISCUSSED--Bonn (DPA)--The ASU (Association of the Self-Employed) has demanded that the German Federal Government finally establish a clear policy regarding the status of foreign workers. Workers from countries outside the EC must be given a clear choice as soon as possible either to allow themselves to be naturalized or to remain in the FRG as "guest workers" with only a limited residence permit, explained Martin Leicht, chairman of the organization, in Bonn. The ASU, an association of primarily middle class entrepreneurs, recommends that all Turks residing in the FRG be requested to decide for or against naturalization within certain time limits. For the rest of the Turks and workers from other countries outside the EC, the ASU said that the returnee policy should apply. [Text] [Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 28 May 84 p 6 12552]

TURKISH BUSINESSMEN IN BERLIN--TSP--The Turkish Businessmens Association, which was formally introduced yesterday, wants to do more toward integrating the approximately 4000 Turkish business into the Berlin economy. As a spokesman said, the association wants among other things to counsel Turkish business regarding legal questions and educational opportunities, help them adapt the structure of their businesses to local conditions and to decrease the sometimes "ridiculous competition" among the Turkish businessmen themselves. They will look for a "House for Turkish Businessmen" to be used as a meeting place and as a location for exhibitions and seminars. Of the current 300 members, most are owners of food stores, snack bars and travel agencies. The chairman is Ihsan Erbas who was one of the first Turks to come to Berlin in 1953. He owns two culinary establishments. [Text] [West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL in German 26 May p 7] 12552

RESTRICTIVE POLICIES DECRIED--Duisburg (AP)--The rather left-leaning "resident groups" of Turks in the FRG have complained of "restrictive policies regarding foreigners" on the part of the German Federal Government. At the opening of the two-day national conference of the "Federation of Progressive Turkish Resident Groups in Europe" in Duisburg, the Chairman, Etem Ete, criticized the government's planned amendment of the Aliens Law as "inhuman and restrictive". This law, proposed by Minister of the Interior Friedrich Zimmermann which would provide for the deportation of all foreigners who draw welfare benefits for a long period of time and have no adequate housing, "fuels the fires of the Neonazis and racists,"

Ete told the 250 delegates. Due to the worsening economic crisis and increasing unemployment, animosity toward foreigners has increased in the FRG and is more and more frequently characterized by hate and acts of violence, explained the chairman of the "resident groups". At the national congress in Duisburg of this 12,000 member Turkish self-help organization which by its own admission sympathizes with the SPD, delegates from all parties represented in the Bundestag participated with the exception of the CDU/CSU. The central issue of the conference was a demand for a residence law for foreigners which would no longer require any kind of residence or work permit. [Text] [Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 28 May 84 p 6] 12552

RETURNEE PREMIUM APPLICATIONS INCREASE--(AP) Bonn--The number of foreign workers applying for returnee premiums and social security refunds is increasing. According to the Ministry of Labor, a total of 9905 foreigners, including 8386 Turks, have so far applied for DM 10,500 in returnee premiums and DM 1500 for each child. According to this information, about 57,000 foreigners to date, including nearly 48,000 Turks, have requested refunds of the money they paid into the social security fund as wage earners. [Text] [Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 28 May 84 p 6] 12552

TURKISH/GERMAN CONTACTS LIMITED--Duisburg (DPA)--"They don't want to have anything to do with us." This is the reason given by Turkish youths for the fact that almost half of them have no contact with their German neighbors. Nearly all of the 400 Turkish school students polled indicated that they had friends in Germany, but about 71 percent of these friendships were among Turks. This statistic is from a report on a model survey conducted by the University of Duisburg in which 118 female and 282 male Turkish students between the ages of 16 and 19 were asked about their situation in Germany. All have lived in the FRG since 1978. Just under one-fifth of them want to stay in Germany, another one fifth want to return to Turkey and the rest are undecided. Experts suspect that the poor job market, the lack of available apprenticeships and restrictive policies regarding aliens are responsible for this indecision. [Text] [Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 28 May 84 p 6] 12552

TURKISH WRITER WINS PRIZE--Zafer Senocak, a 23-year-old Turkish author has received the "1984 Munich Literary Prize", a DM 12,000 scholarship awarded by the city of Munich. Senocak grew up in Turkey and has lived in Munich since 1970. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 7 Jun 84 p 27] 12552

CSO: 3620/345

EX-PCF MEMBER ANALYZES CHARACTER, AIMS OF CEMA SUMMIT

Paris LIBERATION in French 15 Jun 84 pp 34, 35

[Article by Alexandre Adler: "Communist Countries: Family Circle Tightened"]

[Text] The long-awaited CEMA summit ended yesterday in Moscow, with all the heads of aligned states, except Castro, in attendance. It was a meeting that, first of all, enabled the Soviet leadership, in quest of legitimacy, to strengthen its hold over its satellites.

The Moscow summit of CEMA was to mark a high point in Andropov's strategy to regain the grasp of the Soviet bloc. Having abandoned the Third Worldist mirage for the profits and losses of a waning Brezhnevism, Yuri Andropov was trying above all to restore the severely affected cohesion of the East European perimeter. A convinced "occidentalizer," he also hoped, while firmly reinforcing the rampart of the Soviet Union, to thereby introduce some modernizing elements, in Russia itself. His close colleague, Oleg Bogomolov, was also assigned to introduce into the Soviet economic system certain of the experiments judged "positive" in Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany.

After having held several combined summits of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, Andropov was hoping to make this meeting at the highest level the kickoff for a supranational organization of bloc economic cooperation. More flexible than the Warsaw Pact, CEMA also made it possible to ensure the presence of Third World allies, particularly Cuba and Vietnam. Simultaneously, the rapprochement undertaken with China and some specific detente initiatives in Europe could be confirmed, in order to gain better acceptance of the measures for tightening of organic control by the USSR over its vassal states. Alas, Andropov died, and CEMA is not faring very well.

Since his advent to power, Konstantin Chernenko and his appointed mentor in the diplomatic field, Andrey Gromyko, have tried, with a certain obstinacy, to block most of Andropov's initiatives.

Hence, the solemn meeting in Moscow this week no longer reflects the original intentions behind its calling. The reconciliation with China is temporarily in abeyance, for the planned visit by First Deputy Chairman Arkhipov has been postponed sine die. The Chinese, who are skeptical about the chances for survival of the Chernenko team, have for the moment refrained from committing their future, pending the possible return of friends of Andropov, though this does not prevent them--witness the visit of Defense

Minister Zhang Aiping to the United States--from arming themselves in anticipation of tests of strength with the USSR on all their borders: North Korea, Vietnam, India. Likewise, the creation of a money of account for CEMA on the model of the East European, [as published] and the new formulation of the ruble convertibility policy announced at Tashkent at the meeting of Soviet bloc central banks 2 months ago, also no longer reflect the desire of the new team in power in Moscow to slow down economic reforms.

Change in Character

- X Moreover, the meeting has imperceptibly changed in character: its main objective now seems to be to validate at the highest possible level a Soviet direction that is still inadequately assured, and to demonstrate to the world a flawless unity in face of "imperialist aggressiveness."

This time, the desired effect will have failed: one of the participants, and not one of the least important, Fidel Castro, did not respond to the call of the state and party leaders. This was not the first time that the Cuban leader had shown his defiance of the Chernenko-Gromyko team: as a convinced polycentrist, Andropov, for the first time since 1960, had accepted the principle of Cuban leadership of the Latin American and Caribbean communist movements by accepting a relative downplaying of the Soviet apparatus per se. By contrast, the Brezhnev people had always clashed swords to maintain the USSR's own positions in the area.

By supporting (to that extent) the Coard group against Prime Minister Maurice Bishop in Grenada, the "foreign capitalist" secretariat of the CPSU, supervised by old Stalinist Boris Panomarev, certainly bears its share of responsibility in the debacle, whatever the subsequent efforts by Arbatov to relieve Andropov himself from responsibility in the affair. It is possible that Castro, who, at China's instigation, has already delayed to the maximum his announcement of an Olympic boycott, may be waiting for calmer days in Moscow, and for the present wanting to demonstrate his dissatisfaction to his Soviet counterparts.

Further from God and closer to the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro's European colleagues can hardly do other than defer, at least formally, to Chernenko's desiderata: cancellation of Soviet participation in the Olympic Games, with the additional effect of lining everybody up. This strategy of realignment that was begun in February is developing everywhere, with unequal success.

"Psychomania in the Carpathians"

The first on the carpet, the Hungarians, had everything to fear from a return of the Moscow baton, because of the closeness of their ties with Andropov. Moreover, the purpose of Gromyko's visit to Budapest at the end of April seems to have been to get the Hungarian leadership back in step. Simultaneously, the repression of the Magyar minorities in Czechoslovakia and Romania has resumed on an even worse scale now that the Andropov danger has been removed.

Furious, the Hungarians went so far as to raise the possibility of erecting a monument to the Swedish consul, Raoul Wallenberg, who mysteriously disappeared

in 1945 after the arrival of the Soviet troops in Budapest, at the time when Brezhnev was the political commissar on the scene of the drama. The person to person talk between Chernenko and Kader reportedly took place in an atmosphere of unanimity: we may be permitted to doubt this. Certainly, the Chernenko people do not dare to attack the Hungarian reformers head-on; however, the fact remains that they regard the Kader-Aczel-Varkonyi team with extreme distrust.

That is why they deliberately chose to bury the war hatchet with Ceausescu's Romania: the Romanian regime is in fact so weakened by the current collapse in the standard of living of the people and the economic difficulties of all kinds, that it is no longer in a position to confront the USSR, as in the good old days just after 1968. In a way, Ceausescu depends at last resort on Soviet military strength if the case arises of a Polish-type crisis in Budapest. That is the reason for his unreserved approval of the policy of the Jaruzelski junta.

The Romanian president, with utmost hate for the Hungarian leadership, which, on the eve of Andropov's coming to power, presumed to talk about "psychomania in the Carpathians," did not hesitate to show his satisfaction at the death of Andropov, the "tsar of the Hungarians." With Chernenko, who has some knowledge of Romania because of having administered Soviet Moldavia for a long time, the atmosphere is visibly better. When he visited Moscow a few days before the opening of the summit, Ceausescu came to make substantial basic concessions, while obtaining from his Soviet contacts a degree of understanding for the original forms of expression in Romanian policy. Never since 1968 have Romanian-Soviet relations been so good.

As for Zhivkov's Bulgaria, Chernenko is currently missing no occasion to elevate it, in order to eliminate the unfortunate impression of disagreement that Andropov's treatment of that country had not failed to produce abroad. Received just after Ceausescu, the faithful Zhivkov has once again been consecrated as the USSR's best ally.

Graduated and Prudent Measures

It is really up to the three countries of the bloc's crisis area: Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In Poland, the Jaruzelski team, after the unfortunate attempt to take the cross out of the schools, seems to have succeeded in convincing the new Soviet leaders of the narrowness of its internal room for maneuver. Husak has been mollified in regard to possible changes in his governing team. However, Honecker seems to have succeeded in holding fast, in face of the pressures to which he has undoubtedly been subject, in his desire to maintain inter-German relations at a high level.

Having said that, the hardening has begun in earnest in East Berlin: an evangelical priest from Paderbour in the FRG has been refused a visa, which would have been granted without difficulty last year. A new law to preserve public order has been designed to limit the freedom of action of the local pacifists. More serious, Honecker has had to accept a reshuffle of the SED leading bodies, which is not entirely to his benefit: the head of the organization for East Berlin, Naumann, who for 3 years had thundered out

against the indulgence of the government toward pacifism and supported the strong approach both in Poland and East Germany, has been promoted to the party Secretariat replacing Paul Verner, who goes into retirement.

Gromyko's hand is visible in this promotion. It is true that Honecker was able to balance it with the appointment of his heir-apparent Hager, with special responsibility for relations with the FRG and in very close contact with the KGB. The fact remains that the pressure of the Soviets currently risks operating to the detriment of the inter-German dialogue, after having rather favored it during the Andropov years.

In sum, this important meeting of the bloc heads of state will try to prepare a program of common action reflecting the besieged fortress atmosphere in which the Soviet leadership group is trying to confine East Europe. Moscow will ask its partners to reduce their exposure to the world market in favor of greater integration with the Soviet economy; they will plead for policies of energy conservation, in exchange for greater participation in major projects of common interest. The supranational idea common to both Chernenko and Andropov will be raised once again, probably without any immediate followup.

The Polish, Hungarian and East German partners will emphasize the necessity of graduated and prudent measures to save the sometimes precarious equilibrium of their respective social situations. Aside from that, each one will try to wait for better days.

The current convulsions in the Soviet army may give some hope to Andropov's friends. Does the recent article of KRAZNAYA ZVEZDA alluding to release of state secrets by servicemen announce a counteroffensive by Chernenko? What about the death of the air defense general, Romanov, in the GDR at the very time that his role in the KAL Boeing affair had finally been recognized by the withdrawal of the Order of Lenin from the assassin pilot? Do the very official visits of KGB Chief Chebrikov to Prague and Warsaw indicate a policy initiative specifically of the "organs" as opposed to the traditional party?

These are the many uncertainties that virtually compel Chernenko to seek in a big, bloc "Barnum show" a much-awaited confirmation of his vacillating authority.

The CEMA summit, which began on 12 June in Moscow, ended in early afternoon Friday.

Approved at the summit were a "declaration on the guiding principles for development and deepening of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation of the CEMA members," and a declaration by these countries on "maintaining international peace and economic cooperation."

9920

CSO: 3519/392

POST-ELECTION RESULTS: ANALYSIS, COMMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS

European Issue Was Forgotten

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 15-21 Jun 84 pp 10-11

/Editorial: "On All Fronts"/

/Excerpts/ Errors exist in the history of a nation, of a people, of a party that decisively seal their fate or that of developments. Errors exist that have changed the course of history, that have crushed those who have committed them or sometimes have saved them. "Every error has its good side," say the people in their need to hold on to their optimism under the most difficult of conditions. But there also exist errors that are more than criminal, that cannot be forgotten because they are impermissible.

One such error was the tactic employed by ND. Mr Averof said, "The battle will be waged "on all fronts."

To what extent this form of struggle was erroneous is shown by the fact that PASOK hastened to accept it finding it a kind of life preserver. In this way PASOK could get out of the difficulties of a European reckoning and could convert the struggle into a babbling of the Right and of popular participation.

We have followed this "battle" with a critical eye.

Undoubtedly, this impermissible error will be --we foresee this-- and cannot but be fatal for developments in this land.

Outside, in that other Europe, the people there passed their pre-electoral period unsuspectingly. National figures, chosen from among men with militant and European backgrounds, were designated by political parties responsibly and carefully so as to constitute a future European Parliament that would be as complete and representative as possible.

We have set up traps and snares! We neglected problem areas dealing with the Community. We even neglected those who worthily stood up, worked, became known and who became knowledgeable about European affairs and instead we fixed up lists of selected individuals.

Mr Glezos is hastily mobilized --what does that poor fellow know about the Europe of Ten? Mr Mavros is mobilized --and he accepts -- that Europeanist, a lure of an altogether anti-European party, a harpoon of the centrists....

And, on the other hand, other trade-offs: complete decapitation of the former with the goal being renovation as well as a winning over of the centrists (in reality, there is not even one centrist whereas as far as renovation is concerned it is being implemented but only in secondary and hopeless situations, those that are called water-bearer situations).

And as if all of these traps were not enough we forgot all about Europe. We forgot all that it offered us --and we do not mean only what sounds like Euro-units or dollars. We forgot the big benefit, namely that we became somebody! That we, the isolated ones of the Balkan extremity --finally-- entered into a family, equal partners, equal table companions.

Speaking at a recent ELPE /Greek Political Association/ meeting, Prof Faidon Vegleris stressed, "If we think that the consolidation of democracy is not an easy matter, then we must accept the fact that Europe will help us not to fall back into any adventure that would once again dishonor the nation."

Mr K. Karamanlis, who went through the period of great agony and vicissitudes, said the following when he signed the final agreement:

"Greece comes to Europe with the certainty that within the framework of European solidarity national independence is thereby strengthened, democratic freedoms are safeguarded, economic development is speeded up and through the cooperation of all social and economic progress becomes a common product."

Mind you: Why are Spain and Portugal continuing their dramatic appeals and endeavors to join the community if things were so uncertain or so destructive for a nation?

All of these unusually significant achievements are ignored by the Greeks. One of our work teams that wanted to conduct a sample poll on the issue "Greece in the EEC --advantages - disadvantages," registered answers that were unusually insulting to the standards of all of us, answers that showed ignorance, unawareness, prejudice.

That debt for European enlightenment fell to the shoulders of ND. And it betrayed it! ND got over party passions but it did not do anything to enlighten people on the European issue.

It did not say, as it should have said and showed, that our future survival as a nation depends on the good relations we can develop within the Community framework and on the benefits we can derive from the European Community.

It did not say and it did not show that we are somebody in Europe. Outside of Europe we are nothing but an insignificant Balkan country.

Especially, however, ND did not say or show that being in the EEC means that we have entered a space vehicle of the times and we are necessarily running along at its speed toward new worlds, toward new times. Outside of the EEC we would remain envious, small-time wretched side-line spectators of events.

The two duelists were both protagonists in this game of party deception. One in order to hold on to its loot. The other for its haste to get back its lost power. And yet both obtained significant allocations from the European Parliament treasury for their party needs. Of course, they should logically return them since the purpose for which they were given was quite different!

The issue, nevertheless, is certainly not this one. The issue is the fooling of the people since we did not let them realize that their future depends on their normal symbiosis in the EEC, a symbiosis that if the people show prudence and an ability to adapt would be able to open great horizons and prospects for them.

Geographical Variations

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 22-28 Jun 84 pp 9, 19

/Article by N. Delipetros: "Improprieties and Doubts"/

/Excerpts/ During the recent elections a substantial change in the political-party map of the country was noted.

In previous elections there was always some relation in the number of votes that the two big parties received --the two big parties each time-- in the First Electoral District of Athens and in the percentage they finally received in all of Greece.

In the 1981 elections, for example, PASOK received 44 percent of the votes in the municipality of Athens while ND received 34 percent. This 10 percent margin, increased by two percentage points, was equal to the difference shown by the two parties in the final overall electoral results (PASOK 48 percent and ND 36 percent).

This rule also applied to all previous elections. It was valid in the 1981 elections in comparison with the 1977 elections. And in the 1977 elections in relation to the 1974 elections. You only have to get tables of the results of these elections to realize how correct my words are.

This time, however, --indeed the first time-- communications between Athens and the provinces were cut! And the electoral current that undoubtedly went against PASOK in the capital --the electoral results fully showed that there really is such a current-- could not travel to the Greek provinces!

It seems that the Greek provinces have now been subjected --election-wise-- to some other authority. And the electoral currents do not possess passports to visit this foreign land.....

Perhaps figures too have recently acquired some peculiarities and will begin acting abnormally. Thus, while PASOK obtained 44 percent of the vote in Athens

in 1981, this vote dropped to 34 percent the other day. On the other hand, the 34 percent that ND received in 1981 increased to 40.68 percent in the other day's elections. Nevertheless, the differences between the two parties on a countrywide scale not only did not finally go for ND --by nine or at least 7 percentage points -- but to the contrary went for PASOK.

So, for the very first time we had the following incomprehensible result; Last Sunday, PASOK received just 34 percent in Athens but 41.48 percent throughout Greece. ND received 40.98 percent in Athens but was limited to 38.8 percent throughout Greece.

Analysts of electoral results have been trying since the day before yesterday to find out to what the above phenomenon is due. This phenomenon appears curious for the following two additional reasons;

From time to time doubts have been raised over how beneficial our joining the EEC was --at least for the short-time basis-- for Greek industry and for some of the so-called "processing" businesses.

The view had also been maintained that our industry could not come out undamaged from the customs protective shell that safeguarded it. However, one of Karamanlis' theories in connection with learning how to swim ("I will throw you into the sea to learn how to swim") slowly began to become popular among those engaged in industry.

No one, however, dared maintain seriously that our country's joining the EEC *and the community subsidizing of Greek agricultural products would harm Greek farmers!* Nevertheless, the party that fought for our country's joining the EEC got the vote in the big cities where our industries are but did not get it --as would have been expected-- from those who had begun to reap the benefits from the very first hour of our joining the EEC, namely the farmers!

The second reason that makes the electoral results rather strange is that socialism --any form of socialism-- for the first time seems objectionable in the big cities and more likable in the provinces --in towns and villages that are inhabited by those who are especially conservative.

This peculiarity of the Greeks could be justified if our earth being farmed belonged --through ownership-- to a very few big landowners and not to the vast multitude of small Greek farmers.....

However, all of these strange and peculiar things begin to take on some meaning if we taken into consideration the fact that the flow of EEC aid to our farmers has up to now resulted in the Greek rural inhabitants not being financially affected by it as much as those living in the big cities.....

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24-25 Jun 84 p 4

/Article by Kon. Tsaloglou: "Why the Losses Were Limited"/

/Excerpts/ With the acceptance of the fact that the drop in PASOK's electoral strength was due to the refusal by the urban or "urbanized" people to vote for its extermination, two very logical questions arise: why was PASOK's defeat not much greater given the fact that its voters coming from centrist sources are greater in number? Why did all those who abandoned the party of "Change" not turn to the more consequent defense of urban legitimacy, to New Democracy, since they left PASOK for the very defense of "legitimacy?"

Indeed, the flight from PASOK should have been greater in number. Experience teaches that when this or that government is continuously being condemned the repercussions affect the numerical strength of the governing party's members influencing all of those who incidentally and for special reasons had voted for it. Since, therefore, it is a given fact that 25-30 percent of the PASOK voters in the October 1981 elections were centrists, who have no desire to contribute to the communization of their fatherland, the percentage of those abandoning the "Movement" should have been analogous. It was not.

It was not because New Democracy did not succeed in coming up as a party suitable to immediately replace PASOK. ND's campaign against the government perhaps helped dispel illusions about PASOK, the intentions of its leadership, its capabilities and its democratism. It did not, however, succeed in convincing that it could offer a qualitatively upgraded bourgeois regime that the "centrists" had demanded of Mr Papandreou's "Movement." Thus, an argument was provided for all those who had begun to fear PASOK less not to abandon it at least for the time being. In other words, ND, in the way it organized its fight against the government, contributed to "confining" within PASOK its disenchanted or frightened voters, and rendering the defeat of the party of "Change" much smaller than was justified.

ND's primary error in the pre-electoral fight was the prominence of Mr Averof more than the prominence of the party itself. It was an error not so much because Mr Averof has been identified in the minds of a large segment of the "anti-Right" public as a disputed democratic politician of consequence but because Mr Averof is simply the elected president of his party and not its founder as is the case of Mr Papandreou and PASOK. If, consequently, the face of PASOK's founder is the "face" of the party, Mr Averof's face is not, cannot be, the "face" of his own party since any time he may make a decision the party can change it. Consequently, the covering of ND by the excessive prominence of Mr Averof in the affairs of the party created an impression of anti-democratism, at the very time when the battle was being waged to win over democratic voters.

Mr Papandreou exploited to the fullest this impression of anti-democratism by maintaining that ND is not the party that for the previous 7 years had governed Greece with unheard of democracy but is the party of persecutions, exiling and police torture, things that it is ready to resume doing if it were to return to power!

Of course, Mr Papandreou by maintaining all of these things was giving a very arbitrary, in its simplicity, picture of the consequences of the civil war. He thus succeeded in picturing the events of that period as a war between the Right and the remaining forces, centrists and leftists, and not as a clash between the bourgeois and the party that was fighting for the overthrow of its regime.

Bitter Truths for PASOK

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 20 Jun 84 p 9

/Article by Potis Paraskevopoulos: "Sunday's Bitter Truth"/

/Excerpts/ On Sunday, the Greek people did not punish any of the big parties. They simply warned them. And any political leader who openly sounds triumphant or tries to show his policy was justified would not be believed and in fact would be ridiculed. And mainly not to invoke any alibis. The assumption of responsibility, of course, demands courage and woe to the political leadership that does not have it.

The most important message of the electorate to the party leaders is that the people are living through present reality and are not moved by hearing words about the past. The bugbear of communism and Marxist fronts has faded away. It exists only in the phantasies of Mr Averof and of those who are nostalgic about the past.

Nevertheless, the bugbear of the Right did not necessarily act on the followers of the communist Left as PASOK's leadership had hoped for. Neither the communist parties nor the Right now constitute bugbears for the Greek people. Those leaders who invoke these bugbears simply show their inability to study and confront the problems of present Greek reality.

A second significant message of the electorate to PASOK's leadership relates to the government's task and the strategy of socialist change. Here the problem appears serious and should occupy and concern PASOK's leadership as well as the leadership of the two communist parties.

In Sunday's elections, PASOK decreased its percentage by 6.5 points; and, overall, the parties of socialist change by 3 points. This drop requires an explanation.

The view by the communist Left that the Change did not move forward boldly and in depth and that is why it suffers losses does not appear to be well-grounded. The points that PASOK lost to the Right are much greater than those it lost to its Left. If it should also be recognized that the rise of the Right in the big urban centers, where efforts were made to implement certain socialist measures and where socialist ideas usually flower, was much greater than the rise it had in the rural areas where grants had been primarily made and which are more conservative in the assimilation of socialist ideas.

The other view that attributes the losses to physiological damage due to the exercise of power is dangerously reassuring. Damage from the exercise of power is physiological and is justified in bourgeois parties that do not seek radical changes in the structure of bourgeois society. To the contrary, the exercise of

of power by socialist parties must gain new popular masses instead of rejecting them because only then can socialist change move forward with popular consent.

However, this did not occur with PASOK over these past 30 months. It lost instead of gaining popular masses.

And it did not lose them to the Left but to the Right. And it did not lose them in the rural areas but in the urban centers. Not only did PASOK lose in the urban centers but all the socialist forces suffered losses. The electorate in the urban centers "moved toward the Right." That is the bitter truth for anyone who does not hesitate looking straight at the facts.

Of course, there is an opposite view to this which is not unfounded, namely that the losses in the urban centers came from petty bourgeois elements, professional people, handicraftsmen, small merchants and high-salaried workers who are concentrated in the cities. Of course, there are not sufficient electoral statistics to go into or to confirm this view. Nevertheless, socialist changes demand popular consent that must be constantly expanded and not constricted.

This "constriction" must bother PASOK's leadership.

PASOK must reexamine its strategy for socialism and to adapt it to the existing correlation of political and social forces. The 42 percent of the electorate appeared on Sunday to disapprove of socialist change. And of the 58 percent a large percentage must be considered as having disapproved of only the anti-Right government policy and not, at any rate, PASOK's socialist perspective.

With this correlation of forces less socialist yelling is needed but more concrete measures for the recovery of the economy without the ambiguous "socialist wrappings" to impress the "party Left." What is needed is convincing dialogue with small and big businessmen in both the cities and rural areas.

What is needed is dialogue with trade union organizations of workers, both high-salaried and not, and not accusations over "trade unions and interests" that may possibly impress third parties but are not convincing to the interested parties. Social change today is not accomplished "with the hammer and sickle of a worker-farmer alliance" but through the agreement of the great overwhelming majority of the people. And this majority can be won over on a daily basis with concrete measures on behalf of the economy and of the workers and through sincere and open dialogue where the credibility of the political leadership will be confirmed and consolidated.

The policy of PASOK's leadership and government practice from now until October 1985 must win over and break off from the limbs of the Right the consent of conservative elements and not only the applause of party meetings. Those broad popular forces which today oppose PASOK's policy and the prospect for socialist change are to its "right" and not to its "left."

KKE's Position

Athens ANDI in Greek 22 Jun 84 p 15

/Text/ Some confusion in the first KKE announcements does not appear to have been due so much to the electoral results and the percentages related to them but to more general political impressions and repercussions. Not wanting to admit the movement of voters toward the Right and also refusing to weaken PASOK's "self-confidence" over a "new victory for Change," the KKE appears to remain confused. According to others, its contention that its influence has risen can indeed maximize certain limited percentages and can indicate once again the lesser of its ambitions, and yet this contention is unfounded. Indeed, the KKE (just as ND) increased its influence -- to the detriment of PASOK-- in the Greek provinces and almost uniformly throughout Greece. This gives rise to many interpretations, ranging from "a quelling of fear" and "a qualitative rise in organizational work" to "a new dissemination of KKE's ideas." At any rate, matters are cleared up and choices in evaluations become limited if one takes into consideration the fact that the KKE's traditional strength in urban centers remained stationary if it did not slightly regress (in Athens, Salonica and Piraeus). Of course, generally the KKE should be especially satisfied --indeed after the picture of the demonstration in Athens -- over the fact that its fears were dispelled and its electoral influence was not constricted because of the dilemma of polarization. On the other hand, both the KKE and PASOK must, between now and the next parliamentary elections, give thought to an important conclusion dealing with the 1984 Euro-elections; that there exists a growing conservative trend in the big urban centers and a greater radical trend in the Greek provinces. A social and political phenomenon of our post-dictatorship life, completely different to that of the pre-dictatorship period. This fact dictates a readjustment both of strategy and tactics on the part of every leftist party and particularly PASOK. Also, an in-depth study of the repercussions of the handling of power by the government, its character, its hierarchies and its perceivable choices.

KKE Farakos Under Fire

Athens ENA in Greek 21 Jun 84 p 14

/Text/ Georgios Mavros' fate on the PASOK Euro-elections ticket was shared by Grigoris Farakos on the KKE ticket. A representative of a different political line against the government party and of the party considered hard-line and strictly orthodox, Grigoris Farakos was also only the formal head of the pre-electoral campaign. Kharilaos Florakis had the essential word in the campaign. Indeed, when someone from the Euro-elections party ticket was needed to speak over television it was Vasilis Efraimidis. Many remarked that the absence of Grigoris Farakos was willed. In other words, he did not offer political protection in Kh. Florakis' conduct against PASOK. However, objections are not lacking that remind one of the fact that 15 days before the elections G. Farakos affixed his signature to a front-page eight-column RIZOSPASTIS article in which the KKE's distinctive pre-electoral tactics were condensed. And is well-known, "things that are written remain."

ND, PASOK, KKE Errors

Athens ENA in Greek 21 Jun 84 p 16

/Article by P. Bakogiannis: "Prosecutors on the Bench"/

/Excerpts/ The Euro-election results did not surprise ENA's readers. Polls published in our journal had shown that PASOK would move ahead and the differences would be some five points in the areas where the polls were taken. That was what exactly happened.

The poll results were clear. Only those who did not want or could not comprehend: the voters were --and are-- dissatisfied with the PASOK government. Losses suffered by the ruling party are clearly shown. However, this dissatisfaction was not reflected in a broader positive stance on behalf of New Democracy. Why? The reasons are well known: an aged and incapable leadership, both rightist and leftist tendencies, lack of a program, ideology and mainly the general picture that its people are still in a 1950's mental stage. None of them understood what the country and people want today. They were not aware of the fact that we are living in 1984 and not in 1954 or 1964.

All of this was condemned by the voters last Sunday despite the increase in ND's strength by about 2.5 percentage points. It first of all condemned Ev. Averof who thought that if he were to add on a little bit of spice, the Giannis Boutos type, he would appear on the electoral ticket as the ideal Center-Right renovative twin. Thus Boutos' star too eclipsed before it rose.

ND's leader thought that by putting on the Euro-elections party ticket an opportunist like Khristodoulou and a Lambrias, the one who strolls around looking for an arrangement in the presidential antechambers, he would convince the voters that he was engaged in renovation. Mr E. Averof thought that "renovation" is a signboard that you place in front of a microphone when you speak at Constitution Square and automatically the voters jostle each other to get to the polls to cast their votes for ND!

Undoubtedly, ND had both crowds and passion in the pre-election demonstrations. Nevertheless, with the electoral results the Greek people rejected the moldiness of the decade of the 1950's and showed that it did not want only "antis" but wanted positive positions. It does not want only sterile criticism. It also wants programs.

And yet these elections also seriously wounded PASOK and its president -- especially the latter. This is so because although he was not at the head of his party's ticket he nevertheless took upon himself the whole burden of the pre-election fight. Someone should advise the prime minister that it is with great difficulty that he can make himself appear as the one who headed all the struggles of the Greek people over the past 50 years. Someone has to control him because these crowns of his result only in ridicule. And, of course, the percentages he.....so much admired last Sunday.

Of course, the KKE lost out since it remained stationary. This party paid for its servitude to Moscow and the service which, according to instructions from Moscow, it had to offer PASOK. And the big loser is called Grigoris Farakos-- that KKE Stalinist.

The pre-electoral fight and these elections revealed much. The results, however, clearly show that despite the fact that the elections were waged "on all fronts" a settlement of accounts was not accomplished. That is only now beginning.

Every Party a Loser

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 22-28 Jun 84 pp 25-25

/Text/ This time around everybody lost. PASOK saw its strength decline. ND obtained the least, stuck in second place. The KKE stayed where it has been for 40 years. The small parties are breaking up. The extreme rightists are growing smaller in number. And only the KKE (Int.) confirmed its self-existence.

In summary, our observations are as follows:

PASOK: Now in its third year in office it has seen its strength diminish. The Movement is in an unquestionable decline. Its losses were greater in the two big urban centers, Athens and Piraeus. Its course is similar to that of biking: it runs down the slope of the anti-Right. It is not certain that it will stand erect on the equal road of mildness. Its future is altogether uncertain if it does not subdue its extremist positions and does not alleviate the fears that it has created among the productive classes primarily. Above all, if it does not prove its devotion to democratic processes.

New Democracy: Altogether unprepared with slogans, it appeared simply and desperately anti-PASOK without its own physiognomy. The face, the abilities and the sloganeering of the leader instead of endeavors by party followers, it hardly corresponded to electoral needs, if indeed it did so in a negative manner. The waging of the fight "on all fronts" was an impermissible error of strategy and tactics. The absence of genuine centrists, the dismissal of all former Euro-deputies, the appearance of Mr Averof himself at the head of the party ticket and the so-called renovation of the ticket with old names all gave cause to discouragement. Nevertheless, ND showed that it now has organizational competency and above all a lively youth group and determined followers. If it can rid itself of the mental anguish of power and works as a democratic party and provide inspiration it will succeed.

KKE: It remained on its well-known stereotyped positions put forward without any excess, with persuasion and seriousness. Mr Florakis waged a fight with a clearness of views, carefully going along with the government, clear opposition to the conservative government opposition party but also with most obvious incapability to inspire something different. It resembles a trolley car that plies the same itinerary, stops at the same stations, pulls out from the same starting point and reaches the same terminal by way of the same stations.

KKE (Int.): The surprise of the Euro-elections. Even though it is certain that the battle waged and won by one person, Leonidas Kyrkos, during the night of his speech on Constitution Square, it is also certain that he did not give in only to the pressures of polarization but to the destructive hunt by KKE followers who wanted to find an opportunity to write him off the ticket. Nevertheless, the KKE (Int.) that so movingly moaned over Berlinguer also showed an attachment to taboos without being able to open its windows to new ideas. It remained stationary.

EPEN /National Political Union/; It succeeded in alluding to its presence. Thus, the political arena acquires an extreme Right that is directed from the Korydallos line against ND primarily and the President of the Republic secondarily. The beginning and end of its fight is the release of those being held as instigators of the Korydallos coup d'etat.

Small Parties; As for the remaining parties, except for KODISO /Democratic Socialism Party/, words are either superfluous or excessive. Regardless of polarization, they confirmed complete inability to play any kind of role. And the worst is that even though they were to unite their almost negligible strength will not be able to give semblance of a group.

KODISO: Even though it fought stubbornly and with self-denial on the part of its cadres that maintain party organizations and some small strength it was really the big victim of polarization.

Karamanlis Intervention Doubtful

Athens ANDI in Greek 22 Jun 84 p 5

/Commentary by "ANDINOR": "In What Direction the Karamanlis Intervention?"

/Excerpts/ A succession of analysts believe that in the new phase the country has entered following the 17 June elections there are now --objectively-- greater possibilities for an active intervention by the president of the republic.

In what direction, however, could such an intervention be manifested? Given the fact that K. Karamanlis will once again be a candidate for the highest office of the state (May 1985) and that his candidacy will be supported by both PASOK and ND, certain commentators believe that the governor of the land will seek in the next parliamentary elections to prevent any new reckoning between PASOK and ND. Indeed, on this point the statement by Mr P. Kanellopoulos is invoked according to which the Greek people proved with their vote that "they want two parties to exist, not as belonging to another race where one seeks to exterminate the other, but as a genuine manifestation of the Greek soul."

If this estimate means that the president of the republic does not want (because that is what is being maintained by some quarters) an outright majority to exist in the new chamber of deputies, either PASOK or ND, it is a conjecture that remains to be confirmed. The only thing certain is that the president of the republic is still examining the possibility of a coalition government in case -- as is being leaked out by his entourage-- neither PASOK nor ND succeed in gaining an outright majority in the next elections. It is understood that the president of the republic would want this coalition government to be not one going in an essentially leftist direction but rather one going in a Center-Left direction, with the understanding that some ND wing would become the "Center" (let us say under Mr Rallis or Mr Boutos), willing, under certain conditions, to work with PASOK.

5671

CSO: 3521/278

POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

PAPANDREOU TO MOSCOW--Prime Minister Papandreou's visit to Moscow is planned, in principle, for the beginning of 1985. According to reliable sources, Soviet officials recently sounded out our ambassador in Moscow, Mr Grioriadis, to find out when does the prime minister plan to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union in return for Mr Tikhonov's visit to Athens in February 1983. The prime minister's diplomatic office, in reply to the Soviet inquiry, said that the visit will take place at the beginning of next year, without, however, specifying the exact date. [Text] [Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 10 Jul 84 p 1]

CSO: 3521/298

LABOR PARTY, CONSERVATIVES IN CONTEST TO INCREASE MEMBER ROLES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jun 84 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabo]

[Text] The Labor Party and the Conservative Party are in an intense battle to be Norway's largest party. The conservative movement of the late 1970's and early 1980's led to the sensational fact that the Conservative Party became larger than the Labor Party, in terms of membership. The latest figures show that the Labor Party has again caught up with and surpassed the Conservatives. The Labor Party now has 171,122 members, while the Conservative Party has 170,248 members.

It would be misleading not to point out that the Labor Party has a large number of collectively registered members, about 49,000, while the Conservative Party is based entirely on individual membership. But this does not alter the fact that the Labor Party now seems to have the wind in its sails when it comes to recruiting members.

The latest figures are yet another example of the fact that it is easier to operate a party organization when, on the national level, the party is "in opposition" than it is when the party is "in position." It is clearly more inspiring to the two major parties to work when they are on the attack rather than on the defensive. The Labor Party learned this toward the end of its term of office, just before the 1981 elections. The Conservative Party is now beginning to see that this is true.

Some Conservatives are trying to console themselves with the fact that the party has an impressive number of members, compared to the number of votes it received in the elections. But this is not the point. The point is that the Labor Party is recruiting new members faster than the Conservative Party. If this trend continues, the difference in membership in the two parties will soon be much more than the 800 figure of today.

The Labor Party will achieve a psychological victory if the Conservative Party is unable to respond. Organizational chief Sverre Granholt stated: "We cannot fail to respond, now that the Labor Party has several hundred more members than we do. We must do something about this," said Granholt. He added

that the Conservative Party would begin a major membership drive in October.

The party will not remain idle until then, however. On 8 July Kare Willoch will celebrate his 1,000th day as prime minister. This day will be celebrated by the Conservative Party. On 25 August the Conservative Party will celebrate its 100th anniversary. That day will be celebrated by all the Conservative Party's 454 local organizations in the country's 454 municipalities and by the organization on Svalbard. It remains to be seen whether or not there is enough enthusiasm in the local Conservative organizations to regain first place in party membership.

Some prominent Conservatives have stated openly that the party organization has bogged down somewhat, compared to recent years. Many members are calling on the government to bring home some "Conservative trophies," in order to breathe new life into the membership. Many have been irritated by the disagreements among the three coalition parties in parliament that became apparent toward the end of the spring session.

There have been an abundance of explanations, or excuses, within the party organization. This may be seen as yet another sign that Erling Norvik will have his hands full this fall as he attempts to regain the strength the party enjoyed during the "good old days," which in this case were just 3 or 4 years ago.

9336

CSO: 3639/127

CONSERVATIVE PAPER ON LABOR PARTY STRATEGY FOR 1985 ELECTION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial: "New AP Strategy"]

[Text] The Labor Party wants to present itself as a more responsible and credible party, with an eye toward regaining power. The image of an able opposition party will be abandoned. In any event, one of the main points of the Labor Party's strategy for next year's parliamentary elections is to present itself as a strong and united government alternative. This means that the demonstrative oppositional policies will be replaced by more carefully thought-out initiatives--policies that will appeal to a broader mass of people than a few activists on the left wing.

This is a surprisingly good and well thought-out strategy for a party that, since losing power in 1981, has done practically everything possible to eliminate itself as a serious and credible alternative to the present government. To be sure, the Labor Party has a solid core of voters who will rally around the party regardless of what it does in the political arena. These people can be counted on for the most part. To win an election, however, the Labor Party must gain increased support from the so-called fluid voters. It is they who will determine the outcome of the 1985 elections.

The change in strategy and the new, more responsible attitude have come about gradually in Gro Harlem Brundtland's party. The Statoil compromise and the agreement on the main points of Norway's security policy both indicate that the Labor Party wants to follow a new course. If the Labor Party is to receive over 40 percent of the vote, thereby avoiding a dramatic defeat, it must present policies that the party can stand by even when it is in power. Additional losses because of the party's security policy would mean that the 1985 elections would be lost in advance. In domestic matters, there have always been definite to the political recklessness a party such as the Labor Party could allow itself.

The Labor Party leadership now seems to be taking this into account. Now there is greater emphasis on presenting policies that give the Labor Party the credibility it will need as a future ruling party. At a press conference last weekend, Gro Harlem Brundtland seemed quite satisfied with her own role

in this regard. She generously offered to cooperate on issues where the greatest possible unity is desired. She said that, in any event, it would be healthy for the democratic debate if it could be determined exactly how much unity there is. We share this opinion.

One area in which a political compromise could be reached is the future of the national insurance system. Harlem Brundtland believes, however, that a compromise could also be reached on the tax issue. Because of the genuine disagreement between the Conservative Party and the Labor Party on tax policy in our economic system, however, we believe that a consensus on this issue will be virtually impossible.

We should strive for unity where a basis for unity exists, but neither the voters nor the political debate will be well served if genuine differences are covered up. We believe, in any case, that this will not occur when the coalition parties and the opposition answer the election's main question: Which policies will be best able to secure jobs and increase prosperity in Norway?

9336

CS0: 3639/127

POLL INDICATES STEADY INCREASE IN SUPPORT FOR LEFT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Jun 84 p 3

[Article: "Continued Socialist Advantage"]

[Text] The socialist bloc seems to have retained the support of a majority of voters; Norges Markedsdata's political barometer for May revealed that 48 percent of the voters supported the Labor Party, SV (Socialist Left Party), and the Liberal Party. This is almost 1 percent more than in April. The barometer revealed a high degree of stability in both the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. They received 39 percent and 28.6 percent, respectively.

These, and the figures for the other parties, are similar to those of last week's NOI (Norwegian Opinion Institute) poll. Markedsdata's barometer contains only two "visible" changes: the Progressive Party increased its support from 6.7 percent to 7.5 percent and the Christian People's Party registered a slight drop from 8.7 percent to 7.6 percent. The coalition parties achieved a total of 42.5 percent.

The changes for the individual parties are well within the indicated margins of error and, consequently, should not be considered significant. The most interesting aspect of this barometer is that it heralds an upturn in support for the Progressive Party.

	Parl. Election Sept, 1981, %	Local Elections Sept, 1983, %	Jan 1984 %	Apr 1984 %	May 1984, %
Red Election					
Alliance	0.7	1.2	1.1	1.1	0.7
Labor Party	37.1	39.2	38.9	39.2	39.0
Norwegian					
Communist					
Party	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2
Socialist Left					
Party	5.0	5.3	5.9	5.2	5.8
	43.1	46.1	46.3	45.7	45.7
Progressive					
Party	4.5	6.3	7.0	6.7	7.5
Liberal					
People's Party	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.6	0.2
Conservative					
Party	31.8	26.2	28.7	28.6	28.6
Christian People's					
Party	9.3	8.7	7.9	8.7	7.6
Center Party	6.6	7.3	5.7	6.1	6.3
Liberal Party	3.9	4.4	4.0	3.3	3.8
Others	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.1	100.0

Number of responses on party preference	1,141	1,177	1,041	1,001
Total number over 18 interviewed	1,388	1,423	1,261	1,241

This barometer was produced by weighing the figures for each party against the results of the 1981 parliamentary elections. The margin of error is on the order of 3 percentage points for results near 50 percent, about 2 percentage points for results of 10 to 20 percent, and close to 1 percent for lower percentages of the vote.

The interviews were conducted between 14 May and 14 June 1984.

NORGES MARKEDSDATA A/S

9336

CSO: 3639/127

LABOR PARTY FOUND TO HAVE GREATEST VOTER LOYALTY IN POLL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Jun 84 p 5

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] The Labor Party still enjoys great stability among its voters. In this regard, it leads all other parties on the political scene this summer. All of 91 percent of its voters said they would stick with the Labor Party. The Liberal Party has far fewer loyal voters. Liberal supporters seem to hop in and out of the party ranks like rabbits in a field. Liberal Party voter stability has now dropped to 62 percent, compared to 87 percent last March. The Christian People's Party and the Progressive Party are also experiencing major fluctuations.

This may be seen in the May opinion poll and similar polls from previous months taken by NOI (Norwegian Opinion Institute) and AFTENPOSTEN. The fact that we have a relatively volatile electorate was indicated by responses to the following question:

"Did you vote in the 1981 parliamentary elections, i.e. about 2 years ago. If so, if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow are you absolutely sure you would vote for the same party, would you consider perhaps voting for another party, would you perhaps not vote, or are you uncertain as to what you would do?"

Well over half the voters (66 percent) would vote for the same party, 8 percent responded that they would perhaps vote for another party, 3 percent were sure they would vote for another party, and 6 percent would not vote at all. As many as 17 percent--almost one out of every five voters--said they were uncertain as to which party they would choose.

SP Voters Unsure

The largest percentage of voters who were unsure were Center Party voters in the parliamentary elections (11 percent). The Liberal Party had the most supporters (29 percent) who answered that they would perhaps vote for another party.

Thus, the Labor Party has a voter stability of 91 percent. The party has not had such a high level of stability since November of last year. In April of this year the figure was 82 percent. Thus, this month's figure represents a 9-percent increase for Gro Harlem Brundtland's party.

FRP Fluctuates

The figure for the Progressive Party (FRP) was 71 percent, which was a 7-percent drop. In February and March the party's voter stability was as low as 58 percent. Clearly, Carl I. Hagen's party is not characterized by loyal voters.

It does not appear that Jo Benkow's party has especially loyal voters, either. The Conservative Party figure was 74 percent which, to be sure, was 4 percent higher, although it remained relatively low. In February of this year, for example, the Conservative Party's stability among its voters was 80 percent.

KRF Uneven

The Christian People's Party advanced by 12 percent to 84 percent, but the curve is extremely uneven for Kjell Magne Bondevik's party: 87 percent in February, 92 percent in March, down to 72 percent in April, and now back up to 84 percent.

The corresponding curve for the Center Party shows an even rise; a 2-percent rise in May to 80 percent. It should be mentioned in this connection that the party had a voter loyalty of only 66 percent in November of last year.

SV (Socialist Left Party) had a somewhat lower level of stability than SP: a 7-percent rise to 77 percent. The party has not had this great a change since last January when it experienced a 9-percent rise from the previous month up to 84 percent.

The Liberal Party fell 4 percent to 66 percent. The Liberals have had the greatest fluctuations of any party. This is shown by the last seven polls, which provided the following "roller-coaster" curve for the Liberal Party: 58 percent, 77 percent, 61 percent, 57 percent, 87 percent, 66 percent, and now 62 percent in May.

Question: Did you vote in the 1981 parliamentary elections. If so, if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, is it absolutely certain that you would vote for the same party, would you consider perhaps voting for another party, would you certainly vote for another party, would you perhaps not vote, or are you uncertain as to what you would do?

The percentages, according to which party the respondents voted for in 1981, of those who are certain they would vote for the same party if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow are as follows:

	1983		1984				
	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Labor Party	91	84	87	87	85	82	91
Progressive Party	78	66	66	58	58	78	71
Conservative Party	70	70	67	80	73	70	74
Christian People's Party	87	76	78	87	92	72	84
Center Party	66	76	72	72	71	78	80
Socialist Left Party	69	75	84	72	74	70	77
Liberal Party	58	77	61	57	87	66	62

The number of respondents in the individual monthly polls is between 30 and 60 for all parties other than the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. For this reason, the margins of error for the smaller parties may be significant. Thus, for these parties, the figures for a period of several months should be considered.

Oslo, June 1984

NORSK OPINIONSINSTITUTT A/S

9336

CSO: 3639/127

CONSERVATIVES CONTINUE REBOUND IN POLLS

Thirty Percent Share Regained

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Egil Sundar: "Conservatives Marching Ahead"]

[Text] The Conservative Party is strengthening its position, and can again claim the support of 30 percent of the voters. This was shown by the last opinion poll taken by the Norwegian Opinion Institute [NOI] for AFTENPOSTEN during the period 12-25 June. While the Conservatives have advanced 1.5 percent since May, the Labor Party [A], Socialist Left Party [SV] and the Liberal Party [V], which make up the socialists' government alternative, are supported by 49.6 percent, while the government coalition of the Conservative Party [H], Christian People's Party [KRF] and the Center Party [SP] has a total of 43.6 percent. The tendency in the balance between the two blocs remains the same. The three government parties still have much to regain in order to ensure themselves the majority in the Storting election next year.

In the June poll the Progressive Party [FRP] had the support of 5.6 percent, compared with 6.6 percent in May. That means that if the Storting election were held tomorrow the nonsocialist majority would probably lose even with the votes of FRP included.

Much can obviously happen in the time which still remains before the Storting election next fall. It is not known what the situation will be when the Norwegian people again vote on the political direction. In political circles, however, it is a widespread impression that under the existing business conditions it will not be easy to wrest from the opposition the upper hand that it gradually has gained. The Labor Party's new moderate line appears to strengthen that impression. It is even more important that the government coalition establish a more offensive strategy and make sure that nonsocialist policies stand out as a convincing answer to the challenges

of the 80's. Unless that happens, it will not be possible to carry out a mobilization such as the situation now requires on the nonsocialist side. But obviously it will not be easy to win more voters.

The Conservative Party success can indicate that a number of nonsocialist-oriented people gradually understand the danger signals and that to an increasing extent they support the party which is considered to represent the nonsocialist alternative in Norwegian politics. The next polls will eventually confirm whether such a tendency is developing. Success for the Conservative Party can also mean strengthening of the total coalition, something which is clearly evident from the last opinion poll in which the government parties altogether had the greatest support since March. For the KRF their support is unchanged since May (7.8 percent), and the same is true of SP, which now has 5.8 percent, compared with 5.7 percent the last time. About both of these parties it can be said that they have a relatively high stability, although at a somewhat lower level than during the last Storting election--especially the KRF.

The upswing of the Conservative Party can partly be read in the last figure for the FRP, which had 5.6 percent in June compared with 6.6 percent the month before. The relative strength of the two parties is one of many interesting and exciting factors as the election gradually approaches. The NOI poll's basic material confirms that H and FRP largely appeal to the same voters. No less than 37 percent of the Conservative supporters say that FRP is the next best party, while as many as 47 percent of FRP voters give H as the next best party.

The Labor Party continues to have the highest voter stability, with 90 percent, while the FRP has the lowest with 66 percent. In the mass of so-called "floating" voters there are relatively more Progressive Party people than voters of other parties. That helps to explain the standing of FRP in the party list.

It is interesting to note that while the Labor Party has the largest percentage of supporters in the age group 60 and over, the Conservatives show up rather poorly among the elderly. The Labor Party also has relatively greater support among younger voters (between 18 and 29) than the Conservatives. Willoch's and Benkow's party scores best in the year group between 30 and 59. Furthermore the Conservatives have greater support among men than among women, while the opposite is overwhelmingly true for KRF, which has almost double as much support among women as among men.

<u>Party</u>	Storting Election			
	1981	Apr	May	Jun
	<u>Pct.</u>	<u>Pct.</u>	<u>Pct.</u>	<u>Pct.</u>
A	37.1	38.6	40.3	39.3
DLF [Liberal People's Party]	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.6
FRP	4.5	6.4	6.6	5.6
H	31.8	28.4	28.5	30.0
KRF	9.3	8.0	7.8	7.8
NKP [Communist Party]	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1
RV [Red Election Alliance]	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.5
SP	6.6	6.4	5.7	5.8
SV	5.0	6.2	5.4	6.1
V	3.9	4.0	3.7	4.2
Other	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.0
Total	<u>100.1</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>99.9</u>	<u>100.0</u>
A/SV/V	<u>46.6</u>	<u>48.8</u>	<u>49.4</u>	<u>49.6</u>
H/KRF/SP	<u>47.7</u>	<u>42.8</u>	<u>42.0</u>	<u>43.6</u>
H/KRF/SP/DLF/FRP	<u>52.9</u>	<u>50.0</u>	<u>49.3</u>	<u>49.8</u>

Paper Comments on Poll

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jul 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Government Election"]

[Text] From a nonsocialist viewpoint there is obviously every reason to be pleased with the Conservative upswing in the Norwegian Opinion Institute poll for AFTENPOSTEN. Success for the Conservative Party also means that the government coalition is strengthening its position. And considering the forthcoming Storting election that is most important.

A fundamental feature of the recent opinion polls is, however, that the Labor, Socialist Left and Liberal Parties together have an advantage in comparison with the sum of the government parties. Even though the Conservatives are clearly moving ahead, the government coalition still has much catching up to do in order to retain its majority in the Storting.

If the Storting election were held now, it would result in the socialists taking over power. In that case it would be a minority government consisting of the Labor Party, with the declared support of the Socialist Left and the Liberals. A majority government consisting of the Labor Party alone must be considered inconceivable.

Under the existing conditions of strength, as interpreted by opinion polls of four institutes, a nonsocialist election victory is only possible if the Progressive Party eventually comes into the balance position. The sitting government, which is still the only government alternative on the nonsocial-

ist side, will in such case continue as a minority government, dependant on the support of the Progressive Party's representatives in the Storting.

It is easy to agree that this is not a good solution. But it is naturally preferable to a socialist government. Even if on several issues there are considerable differences between the government parties and the Progressives, the leader of the Progressive Party, Carl I. Hagen, has made it clear that they would never cause the fall of a nonsocialist government if the alternative would be that the socialists take over.

We believe that the latter will gradually be further emphasized as the election approaches. In a government election such as we are facing in September 1985, Carl I. Hagen's party will do what it can to convince non-socialist voters that a vote for the Progressive Party is not "thrown away" in connection with the government.

It is just as certain that the three government parties will present the cooperative alternative as the only realistic alternative on the non-socialist side. If it is desired to give the existing government a vote of confidence--and that is of course just what the election is all about--that can only happen by getting maximum support for the Conservative, Christian People's and Center Parties. The upward trend of the opinion polls for the Conservatives can indicate that their reasoning is beginning to break through.

9287

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GOVERNMENT'S RECORD AFTER FIRST THOUSAND DAYS EXAMINED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Alf Seeland: "New Initiatives Begun: Willoch's First 1000 Days"]

[Text] This Sunday marks 1000 days since we have had a non-socialist government under the leadership of Kare Willoch. Its main tasks have been--and continue to be--to strengthen the national economy, fight unemployment and conduct a steady foreign and security policy in cooperation with our allies. The three parties in the government have already made it clear that they will continue to cooperate after next year's Storting election. A combined aggressive policy and performance will now be even more important than during the first 1000 days.

Despite an international wave of pacifism, and with the Labor Party acting unpredictably, the Willoch government has succeeded in holding together a Storting majority on our alliance obligations, and Norway's reliability as a NATO partner has been maintained. Political contact with the EC countries has been strengthened.

Inflation Returning

In 1981 the government inherited a record inflation of 15.2 percent. That has been more than halved, but wage and price increases must be further suppressed if the country's improved competitive ability and increased productivity are to continue and be strengthened. A main feature, now that we are on the right track, is to concentrate on readjustments and structural changes in business.

Better Health Services

The new municipal health law is being guided through. Comprehensive changes in local health services are making increased inputs possible by the communities, primarily better doctor services. But the government recognizes

that appropriations for the health and social sector must still be kept at a high level, at the same time that they work on better efficiency and better utilization of the very significant resources which have already been provided.

In media policy the government has done pioneer work for the great benefit of viewers and listeners. A formerly rigid NRK [Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation] monopoly is being definitely broken, by among other things a comprehensive research and testing activity with shortrange radio, short-range TV and cable TV.

Tax Reductions

Significant tax reductions have been achieved in the past 3 years' budgets, both for individuals and firms. The tax policy is expected to be central in the coming election campaign, and it will be important for the government to show that more real reductions in individual taxes are a decisive precondition for the continued fight against inflation and to stimulate initiative, enterprise and zest for work. The last national budget in the election period must therefore contain that feature.

Unemployment

Unemployment has reached record heights for the postwar period. The government conducts and has conducted an intense fight against it, including youth unemployment. Billions have been invested to bring the unemployment figures down, and the measures are beginning to work.

Rising unemployment was connected with reactions to conditions abroad--and the policy which was followed in this country for years. In the coming election campaign a main issue will be the employment policy. One of the foremost tasks of the government parties from now until the election will therefore be to promulgate understanding that continued improvement of the nation's economy is a requirement for having more people employed.

Reducing the Bureaucracy

Simplifying the laws and reducing the bureaucracy has always had a central place in the government's work. Rules and regulations have been reduced, a new mentality in the direction of efficiency and rationalization is spreading in connection with "Public Action" and elsewhere. Parallel with measures to strengthen property rights and the rights of the individual, there have been purposeful and consistent efforts in these fields.

Well Constructed

This coalition government has a more firm leadership and is much better held together than what was experienced during the Borten Government. Therefore it sets a goal for itself to renew its majority next year--without becoming

dependant on "balance parties." The government's greatest weakness has been the lack of timely coordinated information about its work. It now has a formidable challenge from a Labor Party which is winning back self-confidence and inner solidarity.

Combined Input

Continued majority for a nonsocialist coalition government is essential for further progress and for a steady alliance policy. The three parties know that. But the coalition must strengthen its combined input, performance and information so that the voters will also see the importance of next year's fateful election.

9287

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LABOR PARTY COMMITTEE URGES ROLE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Jun 84 p 5

[Article by Alf Seeland]

[Text] Norway must help shape Western European foreign policy. If the Western European Union becomes more active, then Norway should join. Close cooperation with the United States is still needed and our energy situation should be seen from a European perspective. The Labor Party's working group on European affairs, led by group secretary Bernt Bull, a former EC and NATO opponent, agreed unanimously on these main points. The working group stressed the importance of the greatest possible unity behind our foreign and security policy.

Over almost 2 years and in more than 40 meetings the working group, which includes former AUF (Labor Party Youth Organization) chairman Thorbjorn Jagland and present vice-chairman Jens Stoltenberg, has reached many of the same conclusions as the new leader of the British Labor Party, Neil Kinnoch, before he began a campaign to orient his party more toward Europe. Thus, the group maintained that, because of its regional, geopolitical, and social interests, Western Europe should become more independent in the area of European security.

United States Needed

At the same time, the study group on European affairs stressed that European and American security interests usually coincide and the group's report states: "Western European security is now dependent on close cooperation with the United States. This now provides the necessary military and political strength to counterbalance Soviet military capabilities."

The new direction of the British Labor Party is reflected even more clearly in the group's statement that more extensive Western European cooperation would be a natural development. The Council of Europe and EFTA (European Free Trade Association), with their limited possibilities, are considered by the group to be of little significance. The report places particular emphasis on the European Community and stresses that overcoming the present crisis within EC

is in the interest of every European country. This cooperation must be developed in such a way as to meet the present needs of Europe. This approach has been advocated by the Social Democratic Parties and the labor movement of Europe. "By emphasizing economic planning and by solving concrete problems such as unemployment, environmental issues, welfare, and peace and disarmament issues, EC cooperation could make a significant contribution toward solving the problems of Western Europe," the group said.

Eastern Europe

The so-called all-European concept is also present in the document as an argument in favor of stronger Western European cooperation. The document indicates that there have been some signs that the Eastern European countries are showing a stronger desire than ever before to protect their interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. "There is reason to believe that increased Western European influence on cooperation in the West could make it easier for the Eastern European countries to gain greater freedom."

The Labor Party group stated that Norway could play a role in Europe through its oil and gas deliveries. We could achieve greater influence than the size of our country would indicate, the group said, and stressed that Norwegian energy policy must be based, more than it is today, on broader security and foreign policy considerations so that, for example, Norwegian interest in detente and cooperation in Europe would be included in our energy policy. Norway should help develop a joint energy strategy for Europe.

Labor's Responsibility

In its analysis of the situation, the group stressed the significance of the broadest possible support for Norway's foreign and security policy and that the Labor Party bore the primary responsibility. "The party has a particular responsibility to evaluate continuously the significant changes that are taking place around Norway and decide what policy would best serve the interests of Norway," the report said.

The Labor Party's working group on European affairs presented its report to the party's international committee. The debate over the party's platform will be based to a considerable extent on this report. In addition to Bernt Bull, the group consisted of members of parliament Knut Frydenlund, Helen Bosterud, and Kirsti Grondahl, LO (Federation of Trade Unions) members Kaare Sandegren and Olav Boye, Foreign Ministry representatives Turid Sand and Sverre Jervell, and AUF members Thorbjorn Jagland and Jens Stoltenberg.

Should Join Western European Union

The Labor Party's group on European affairs went further than the usual statements that Norway should expand cooperation with EPS:

"We must make arrangements that will permit us to help shape European policy," the group's report stated. It then said, in effect, that Norway should affiliate

itself with the Western European Union.

"Western European efforts to strengthen detente and create a new defense and security system in Europe are in the best interest of Norway. If the present discussions aimed at reactivating the Western European Union lead to results, then Norway must work to permit all the Western European countries to participate on an equal footing in the further development of this cooperation," the Labor group stated.

Thus, in order to advance our European policies and to make the debate more concrete, the group proposed Norwegian affiliation with the Western European Union, i.e. West Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, and the Benelux countries.

About 2 weeks ago a preview of the Bull committee's report was revealed when Reiulf Steen called for a new emphasis on European policies and his fellow party member Haakon Blankenborg requested at a seminar on Europe that the government present a report on Europe to parliament.

The majority of the Labor Party's unanimous working group on European affairs were previously EC opponents.

9336

CSO: 3639/127

WRITER CHALLENGES MORALITY OF SOARES GOVERNMENT

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 21 Jun 84 p 3

[Article by Manuel de Portugal: "What Kind of Morality?"]

[Excerpts] I was wrong after all. Mario Soares is not in Portugal. Again. It seems he is en route to Korea. On the way to Japan. Before going to Maputo. And on to Zambia. In one whole year, he only spent April here in the country.

The Mario Soares scandal has reached the point at which it is very possible that he spends more time traveling than tied to his desk seeing to the resolution of the most urgent problems of state.

If in fact Soares has been required to travel this much for our welfare (which I do not in any way believe), what reason could there be for the crazy expenditures needed for the vast entourage he takes with him? If there were a minimum of shame felt by the present government leaders, the example for austerity would begin at the top.

Shamelessness

The attitude which prevails is that Portugal is a province "they" can exploit as they will.

What kind of morality have these people without morals who impose on the miserable citizens of Portugal the blackness of detested austerity, while "they" squander our money in unthinking, prodigal and even criminal fashion?

How is it possible that the government is so shameless as to pardon a debt of \$17 million on the part of Guinea-Bissau, while we, who are in debt up to the roots of our hair, go about trying to obtain loans of foreign exchange which are necessary, indeed essential for our survival?

What madness, what paranoia, what irresponsibility is this on the part of a government which gives a foreign country the money which Mr Alipio Dias took from our pockets in special taxes and other base fiscal maneuvers to wrest from us the few escudos we have? What kind of morality is it when Dr Ernani Lopes prohibits us from traveling, punishing the citizens of Portugal with a tax of 1,000 milreis for each departure from the country, and limiting what we can take with us to 30 contos per year (so that the country can save the

limited foreign exchange it has), while subsequently Dr Soares, wanting to put on a show at our expense, allows himself the luxury of "forgiving" a debt of \$17 million owed to a Portugal which lacks hospitals and health care?

You will tell me that since Guinea is practically bankrupt, the debt was uncollectible anyway. Indeed? Then why has it been lent \$3 million more now, in a supplementary credit line, if it is already known at the outset that this is money poured into the bottomless pit of the empty coffers of total insolvency? Are we going to joke with the sacrifices made by the people of Portugal, or is their arrogance so great now that they think they can do anything they want, because no one is supervising them?

Hunger

They went into the bush to kill Portuguese citizens. They wanted to be independent. They slandered us, calling us exploiters and colonialists. And now they want us to pay the cost of their economically unworkable and financially impossible independence? What does it matter that there is hunger in Sao Tome or Guinea-Bissau, in Mozambique or Angola, if this is due to misgovernment by the communist or communist-like governments in office there? What concerns the citizens of Portugal (and should concern Dr Mario Soares, Prof Mota Pinto, Dr Ernani Lopes and the tax-sucking Alipio Dias) is the fact that Manuela Matos, representing the Portuguese Caritas, assures us (with the weight and responsibility of her experience) that "there are people even suffering from hunger" in Portugal. What should concern Dr Mario Soares is the warning issued by social aide Teresa Abrantes who publicly and loudly has stated that "the number of individuals stealing in order to eat" has increased in the aristocratic tourist municipality of Cascais.

And this, my friends, is the situation. While hunger is beginning to be atrocious in the district of Setubal, while the people in Tras-os-Montes live on a subhuman level, with no means of feeding their children, while "shameful hunger is advancing terribly in Lisbon and Oporto," Soares and his entourage are traveling to Japan. The government has abandoned a handsome note worth \$17 million. Plus \$3 million it will never see again. And the people of Portugal alternate between confusion and anguish, wondering where all this will end.

What are the duties of Mario Soares? The defense of the interests of Portugal and alleviation of the hunger experienced by Portuguese citizens, or defending the economy of Guinea-Bissau and balancing the budget of foreign countries which, it happens, still speak Portuguese?

What morality is there in a government leader who appears on television to say that we must make sacrifices, and then, further weakening the impoverished "national" economy, loses \$20 million as if the money were his own and as if he had to give no accounting of it to anyone?

What kind of morality is there in a government which allows everything to increase, from the exorbitant rates for water (which we lack because the workers are on strike) to the sacrosanct price of bread, which is the basic foodstuff enabling us to outwit hunger?

What morality is there in a government which threatens to punish the small businessmen who owe some money to social security, forcing them, with incredible violence, to pay compound interest, and then forgiving foreigners in Guinea a debt of millions and millions of dollars, as if the austerity they preach should be only for those who contribute to social security and pay taxes, but never for a prime minister who lives off the fat of the land and whose whereabouts one never knows--Japan, Thailand, Iceland or Afghanistan?

What kind of morality is this?

5157

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SOARES SAYS AID TO MILITARY CANDIDATE IMPOSSIBLE

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 23 Jun 84 pp 1, 24

[Text] The possibility that Firmino Miguel might be the presidential candidate of the coalition is not viable. According to a source close to Mario Soares, the PS [Socialist Party] will not support him, even on the second ballot. In a statement made prior to the departure of the prime minister for Asia, this source voiced considerable skepticism about the political advantage of choosing another military officer to serve as president of the republic, since his activities might be similar to those in the first term served by Eanes, but with "even more negative" consequences. Soares is reported to have been categorical: the PS will not support any military officer, whatever the circumstances might be.

Gen Firmino Miguel has been much discussed in political circles as a possible candidate for the PSD [Social Democratic Party], although he himself has never formally confirmed any invitation to serve as such. In an article in POVO LIBRE, Rui Machete, the No 2 man among the social democrats, urged a "candidate equidistant" from the two coalition parties, but yesterday a source close to the vice president of the PSD told us that the minister, in defining the advantages of such a candidate, "was not thinking of Firmino Miguel nor of anyone else in particular."

In this connection, there are obvious differences in Buenos Aires (not to mention, obviously, the Mota Amaral supporters). A member of the PSD cabinet told EXPRESSO this week that Firmino Miguel might be a candidate "acceptable" to the PS despite the hesitation of Soares, inasmuch as "he is equidistant from the two parties" and therefore would not raise the issue of the coalition in power. On the other hand, there was some surprise in party circles at the positive reference to Firmino Miguel made by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, as reported in SEMANARIO, after that political leader had mentioned the name of Alberto Joao Jardim at the Braga congress as an example of an ideal candidate for the party.

Moreover, Mota Pinto's position at that meeting gave further credibility to the reports that the vice prime minister is seeking to win leadership of the government in exchange for support of the presidential candidacy of Mario Soares, but more recent indications suggest that the general has too much electoral weight for a tactic which could only be useful with a less prominent personality. (See "In the Political Wings Last Week" on page 2.)

RECORD OF SOARES GOVERNMENT TO DATE ANALYZED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 1 Jul 84 p 9

[Article by Vasco Pulido Valente: "Mario Soares' Train"]

[Text] A year after his auspicious installation in power, what is the balance to be struck where Mario Soares is concerned? Where has he lost and where has he gained? What did he do right and what did he do wrong? Have circumstances helped or hindered him? What worked for him and what against?

The following worked in his favor:

1. The end of the question about the regime, which no one is debating seriously any longer. The constitutional amendments proposed by the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] and the right wing of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] met with skepticism and absolute apathy. Neither the country nor the politicians believed that they could result in the slightest benefit.

Without a doubt there are some songbirds who continue to pine for a moderate presidential system, for regionalization and reform of the electoral law. But they do not represent a threat, nor even an inconvenience. Isolated and unknown, they go almost unheard.

The institutions are universally accepted. This province, so long in rebellion, has been pacified. Mario Soares and the PS [Socialist Party] will not see themselves forced again (or very soon) to defend the rules of the game which, to their own exclusive advantage, they dictated with regard to the constitution and the Democratic Alliance of Balsemao. The regime is their castle.

2. The left wing has for some years now been defeated. Without strength, without a program, without a future. So sad is its status that one says everything except "leftist," as if the mere word suggested an insult or a crime. The PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] committed suicide out of loyalty to the Soviet Union. The independent socialists and the few who continued to push for the PS were weakened by the marriage with Eanes. Both brought upon themselves their own destruction. The best they can propose to us today comes down pathetically to the establishment of a party with an equivocal identity and fuzzy goals, in order to reconcile the irreconcilable and to absorb a certain political unemployment. Mario Soares does not need to concern himself with such developments.

3. The economic crisis drastically changed the civic sentiments of the middle class. Its members, suffering blows to their wallets and benefits, immediately forgot those famous workers whose liberation was once so important to them. It did not take too long to make the choice between doing without their beefsteak and tolerating the emotional suffering of unemployment and the decline in the real wages of others.

The workers from Barreiro and elsewhere who went into the streets and suffered the blows from the cudgels of the competent democratic police did not find the proverbial intellectuals on their side. It is even understandable that these latter should reserve their always immediate indignation for more serious matters such as the increase in taxes or the absurd price of compact cars.

Mario Soares refuses to be intimidated by skirmishes of this sort. The ideological orthodoxy of the middle class dictates that the workers should work (if there is work) and not be too much in evidence. The just distribution of sacrifices does not--repeat not--begin at our house. It begins at theirs.

4. Very different from what is assumed and officially announced, the existing poverty is not encouraging social agitation. On the contrary, it is snuffing it out. Each dismissal, each factory closure prevents a strike. Each student denied entrance into the university arouses in those who are enrolled an immoderate appetite for order and great respect for their professors. Each devaluation of the escudo on its majestic slide toward the bottom of the well eliminates one public gathering. Mario Soares can therefore look forward to tranquil days.

5. Finally, to use the old phrase, "political passions are subsiding." In other words, since all of the active professional politicians have all been and still are both for and against everyone, that cosmic perfection has been achieved wherein neither respects the other and no one respects them. Ideas and convictions of any intensity or kind have become an embarrassment, recalling lower stages in a providential evolution and limiting freedom of movement within the splendid interior of the established chaos. The "central bloc," that formless, elastic, mistaken mass, is the essence of the April nation. It emerged, grew, established itself and submerged us.

Mario Soares (and Mota Pinto) can rest easy in the knowledge that nothing can destroy it, because nothing distinguishes it or is distinguished from it, nothing is outside or beyond it, since in their rhetoric, their methods, their emptiness, their indolence, the "central bloc" and its worst enemies are a single and indivisible political gelatinous mass.

The fact remains that despite the idyllic year they have had and the reassuring future which awaits them, Mario Soares and Mota Pinto have committed some errors and failed to resolve one small problem. They have against them the following:

1. They did not demonstrate sufficient generosity toward their internal adversaries. Some of the few people who opposed them in the PS and in the

PSD could have been bought with posts, sinecures or other kindnesses, or even, as in the case of Capucho, were eminently suitable for business association. Soares and Mota Pinto forgot the basic principle of their incomparable triumphs, or the law of the central bloc, which goes as follows: "The health and survival of any established confusion depends on its continued spread. Its extension should be proportional to the volume and degree of confusion at a given moment. To stop is to die."

2. A good government cannot do without enemies in order to keep the herd under control and calm. But Soares and Mota, like the little shepherd, tried to instill such fear among their own that almost no one believes them any longer. In their interests and in the interests of the fatherland, they should not continue from now on to ignore the most important law of the bad wolf, to wit: "The number of times a given number of individuals can tremble in terror at a mention of General Eanes, the PCP or Soviet expansionism grows ever smaller and is finite."

It is necessary to deal, as promised, with a small problem which neither Soares nor Mota Pinto, very busy it is true, have taken up. With the so-called "stability" guaranteed, the continued enjoyment of power by the "central bloc" ensured, and the citizens of Portugal neatly lined up with their hands and nails clean, the country would like the government to inform it of how it plans to rescue it from its present misery. In other words, what is the strategy for development? When the 19th century tumult had ended, Fontes Pereira de Melo came forward with a formula: ask for loans of money, one after the other, to build ports, highways and railroads, such as to sell farm products and create a modest domestic market for the modest industry which was developing. Portugal listened, and for 30 happy years, only the means were debated, and an effort was made to obey Fontes. Admittedly the times are more complicated now. However, the question remains. Where will we find the money we lack? In services (what services?), in industry with advanced technology, as some lunatics suggest, or in the dregs of Europe? And where does one begin? Who begins? At what speed? Where are the trains of Mario Soares? The train law is simple. It says: "Without trains, one gets nowhere."

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CSO: 3542/75

DISCUSSION CONTINUES ON CREATION OF EANIST PARTY

Poll Shows Party's Primacy

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 29 Jun 84 p 18

[Text] An "Eanist" party could attract 24 percent of the electorate if legislative elections were to be held this moment, but it must be admitted that this score may be the maximum, corresponding to the suprapartisan image of President Eanes.

The reservation mentioned results from the fact of being faced with an analysis of outcomes based upon a mere hypothesis in which the figure of Gen Ramalho Eanes, placed until now above the partisan strife that is traditional in political life, is being projected.

Translated into the Tables I through IV that accompany this article, the results presumably obtained by the various parties and coalitions--in the existing party context and also on the assumption of what is called, for sake of convenience, the "Eanist" factor becoming a political force--were arrived at by analyzing the data from successive surveys of the electorate, made especially for O JORNAL since last January.

According to the findings of these surveys, made by Marktest for O JORNAL, within the scope of a continuous collaboration begun at the first of the year, 24 percent of the voters would now be available to support a possible new party (in May there were 22 percent), which would put it in first place.

The voters of the new party would presumably be obtained at the expense of the PS [Socialist Party] (which would fall from a hypothetical 31.3 percent within the current party setup to 20.8 percent in the presence of the new force) and the APU [United People's Alliance] (whose rise would be hindered to the degree that it would not obtain more than 16 percent, compared with the 22 percent possible within the existing party spectrum).

The PSD [Social Democratic Party] would have a lesser fall (21.3 percent, compared with 24.8 percent), while the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] would in either case retain about 16 percent of the vote.

Reading the tables shows that in each 1,000 voters of the new party 475 would come from the PS, which would translate into a much more serious loss than those assumed

Tables I and II. Within the Current Party Structure, APU and CDS Would Rise, but the PS/PSD Bloc Would Continue With a 56.1 Percent Majority

(1)

Quadro I

		Como votaria agora (2)					
		PS	PSD	APU	CDS	(3) Outros	(4) Não votaria
(5) Como votou em 1983	PS	68,3	0,8	5,2	1,2	3,1	21,4
	PSD	2,6	73,4	0,3	8,2	3,7	11,9
	APU	1,0	—	87,1	—	2,0	9,9
	CDS	1,4	0,5	1,2	84,5	—	12,4
	Outros (3)	0,7	5,9	0,5	—	59,0	33,9
	Não (4) votava	11,2	8,5	7,6	7,0	2,7	63,0

(6) Percentagens horizontais

(6)

Quadro II (7)

		Percentagens verticais	
		(9) Votação em 1983	(10) Votação actual Maio Jun.
(11) Votos expressos	PS	37,1	32,3 31,3
	PSD	27,9	25,6 24,8
	APU	18,6	20,5 21,7
	CDS	12,9	15,8 16,5
	Outros (3)	3,5	5,8 5,7
	Abst. + (12) brancos	24,2	24,9 27,3

Key:

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Table I | 7. Table II |
| 2. How Would Vote Now | 8. Vertical percentages |
| 3. Others | 9. Voting in 1983 |
| 4. Would Not Vote | 10. Current Voting: May and June |
| 5. How Voted in 1983 | 11. Votes Expressed |
| 6. Horizontal percentages | 12. Abstentions and Blank Ballots |

Tables III and IV. "Eanist" Party Could Attract 32.7 Percent of the PS Votes and 28.9 Percent of the APU Votes, to Reach 24 Percent of the Total

Quadro III (1)

		Como votaria agora (2)					
		PS	PSD	APU	CDS	(3) Partido "Eanista"	(4) Outros
(6) Como votou em 1983	PS	45,2	1,4	4,8	2,2	32,7	9,8
	PSD	1,5	65,5	0,5	10,9	6,5	13,8
	APU	—	—	66,0	1,0	28,9	—
	CDS	4,3	1,8	2,0	83,5	1,8	—
	Outros (4)	9,3	21,4	17,7	—	22,6	—
	Abst. + (6) brancos	12,6	9,2	6,2	6,4	16,3	4,3

(7) Percentagens horizontais

Quadro IV (8) (9) Percentagens verticais

		(10) Votação em 1983	(11) Votação actual Maio Jun.
(12) Votos expressos	PS	37,1	21,7 20,8
	PSD	27,9	22,4 21,0
	APU	18,6	16,2 16,1
	CDS	12,9	15,0 15,0
	Partido (3) "Eanista"	—	22,1 24,9
	Outros (4)	3,5	2,0 1,9
Abst. + (6) brancos		24,2	19,3 19,3

Key:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Table III | 7. Horizontal percentages |
| 2. How Would Vote Now | 8. Table IV |
| 3. "Eanist" Party | 9. Vertical percentages |
| 4. Others | 10. Voting in 1983 |
| 5. Would Not Vote | 11. Current Voting |
| 6. Abstentions and Blank Ballots | 12. Votes Expressed |

Table V. Only Half of the "Eanist" Party Would Vote for Pintasilgo for Belem

(1)

Quadro V (2) Percentagens verticais

«Candidatos» (3)	Como votaria actualmente em legislativas						
	Total	PS	PSD	APU	CDS	Partido «eanista»	Não votava
Mário Soares	13	47	8	2	2	(4) 11	(5) 1 (6) 5
Mota Amaral	11	7	30	1	14	8	11 8
Freitas do Amaral	13	6	22	2	60	7	6 6
Firmino Miguel	3	2	0	1	6	1	1 3
Almeida e Costa	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Salgado Zenha	2	3	2	4	—	2	— 2
Lurdes Pintasilgo	25	15	3	60	5	60	14 14
Garcia dos Santos	1	2	—	3	—	2	2 —
Mota Pinto	2	1	5	1	2	—	1 2
Não votava (7)	16	8	8	15	6	11	45 27
Não respondeu (8)	15	11	10	11	7	8	20 33

Key:

1. Vertical percentages
2. How Would Vote Currently in Legislative Election
3. "Candidates"
4. "Eanist" Party
5. Others
6. Did Not Vote
7. Did Not Vote
8. No Response

Table VI. Only 38 Percent of Pintasilgo's Votes Would Be From the "Eanists"

(1)

Quadro VI (2) Percentagens horizontais

«Candidatos» (3)	Como votaria actualmente em legislativas						
	PS	PSD	APU	CDS	Partido «eanista»	Outros	Não votava
Mário Soares	65	9	2	1	(4) 15	(5) 1	(6) 7
Mota Amaral	11	39	1	13	13	10	13
Freitas do Amaral	8	24	2	46	9	3	8
Firmino Miguel	11	40	2	20	8	4	15
Almeida e Costa	—	48	4	—	24	—	24
Salgado Zenha	30	15	22	—	18	—	15
Lurdes Pintasilgo	12	2	31	2	38	5	10
Garcia dos Santos	31	—	24	—	29	12	4
Mota Pinto	8	45	9	14	3	7	14
Não votava (7)	7	8	12	4	12	27	30
Não respondeu (8)	13	10	9	5	10	13	40

Key:

1. Horizontal percentages
2. How Would Vote Currently in Legislative Election
3. "Candidates"
4. "Eanist" Party
5. Others
6. Did Not Vote
7. Did Not Vote
8. No Response

for the other groups: 71 from the PSD, 210 from the APU, 9 from the CDS and 31 from other parties, as well as 204 who previously abstained.

Looking at things in another way, the PS would lose 32.7 percent of its voters to the new party, while the APU would lose 28.9 percent, the PSD would lose 6.5 percent, the CDS, 1.8 percent, and "others," 22.6 percent.

The figures shown in Tables I through IV confirm, generally, the data gathered the previous month and published in O JORNAL, No 484, of 1-7 June, through analysis of the replies of 2,500 persons interviewed in urban centers with more than 10,000 inhabitants.

For this purpose, the simulation model based upon the matrix of vote transfer was used, taking the voting of April 1983 as a base. According to the Marktest experts, the results represent the outcome for the entire electorate, with a maximum error of about 2 percent.

But Only Half Would Support Pintasilgo

Tables V and VI, in turn, are indicative of the relations between the possible new party and Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, traditionally associated with it as one of its most prominent figures.

The findings of the Marktest/O JORNAL survey for the month of June show that a hypothetical candidacy of Lurdes Pintasilgo for president of the republic (in which she would, by the way, receive 25 percent of the votes) would be supported by only half of the potential voters of the possible "Eanist" party, among which 11 percent would prefer to support Mario Soares, 8 percent favor Mota Amaral and 7 percent are for Freitas do Amaral (see Table V).

Moreover, analysis of the potential votes for Lurdes Pintasilgo shows that only 38 percent of her total would come from "Eanist" votes, as 31 percent would be from APU sympathizers, 12 percent from PS voters and 2 percent each from the PSD and the CDS (see Table VI).

Popular Dissatisfaction: Strength, Weakness

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Jul 84 p 6

[Editorial: "Party or CNARPE II?"]

[Text] A little more than 1 year ago the "intellectuals" of the erstwhile CNARPE [National Committee to Support Reelection of President Eanes] came out of seclusion and stirred up the political scene. But it was a false alarm. There emerged MAD [Movement for Study of Democracy], which, after all, was not a party and did not pretend to be one, but merely an "ethical movement for study," as Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo called it. Its action has consisted of episodic seminars and hardly any public participation. Yesterday, near Abrantes, the "operators" of the same erstwhile CNARPE met for the purpose of "laying the foundations of a new and indispensable political force," according to the words of Herminio Martinho, the biggest operator of the "operators," it would appear. A movement was started that is intended to be an alternative to the coalition in power. For one who is limited to "laying the regional foundations," the objective is ambitious. But after such great expectations, only a daring declaration could make sense of the project. Otherwise, no one would consider it as anything more than a second MAD.

The much-heralded "Eanist" party, which some desire and others fear, seems finally to be on its way and from now on there will be no lack of pretexts for political struggle with inevitable institutional reflexes. Eanes is president of the republic and guiding influence of the Abrantes "operators"--whether or not he has assured them of his support--and the new movement is presented with the avowed purpose of combating the centrist bloc that is now in power in the government. It is not difficult, therefore, to predict an aggravation of tensions between the two branches of the government, which, as a matter of fact, has been the dominant note in their relations.

But what will the future party be like? It is known that it intends to "renew confidence and organize hope," a slogan so vague that it could be adopted by any organization. It is situated in the area of democratic socialism and of social democracy, which in itself doesn't reveal much, but this is enlarged upon by some specific proposals that have been on the agenda for a long time: to strengthen the presidential component of the regime--Mota Amaral advocated that during the period when he fleetingly was a candidate for Belem and it is not surprising that certain parties responsible for constitutional revision also favor it, since the president is "their man"; partial modification of the electoral system, in order to combat the "current monopoly of parties"--an issue that, among several others, caused Antonio Barreto and Medeiros Ferreira to leave Parliament more than 6 years ago; regionalization and decentralization--themes dear to the hearts of nearly all existing political parties, when expressing their intentions, as is the case with such praiseworthy proposals, so universally advocated and always forgotten, as guaranteeing independence to the media or eliminating political patronage in public administration.

From what is known, therefore, there is nothing very new about the concerns that could make up a party platform. Nor is it likely that the movement's promoters are counting upon being able to galvanize the electorate; the factor they are counting upon is simply the accumulated capital of the prestige of the public figure who serves as their inspiration--Ramalho Eanes--and the hope that the banner they unfurl will be sufficient to attract a multitude of malcontents, of which there are some in practically all political sectors. And here reside, perhaps, both the strength and the weakness of an "Eanist" movement. Since there are so many malcontents and they come from such a broad spectrum, it will not be an easy task to bring them together in an organization whose characteristics will be, really, those of a front more than those of a party.

In choosing this moment to launch their political participation, the Abrantes "operators" appear to be revealing the intention of creating a platform to support a future presidential candidate, perhaps the one they have been promoting for a long time--Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo. This would be her first test of strength, unless one feels, from the outset, that something unforeseen will happen to the central bloc--due to endogenous or exogenous factors--that would result in holding early elections. If that does not happen, the Abrantes movement would have to "run on empty" until 1987, which would not be very beneficial to its ambitions. And if, moreover, the presidential candidate they eventually nominate is not elected, then the "Eanist" militants will not have founded either a party or a political front, but only a CNARPE II. But if they lose this time, it may permanently seal their fate.

CNARPE Members Seen Cautious

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 23 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by Pedro d'Anunciacao: "Eanes Will Resign If Eanism Advances"]

[Text] The parliamentary bill that increases the salary of the president of the republic was finally approved last Tuesday, with a curious alteration from the text initially proposed by socialists and social democrats. The alteration,

suggested by centrist deputy Luis Beiroco, and which had previously met with opposition from the majority parties, allows presidents who resign the position to retain the modified privileges provided for the functions performed.

What is particularly curious about this is the fact that Ramalho Eanes is at this moment probably pondering precisely the possibility of resigning. A possibility that could become quite likely, should the Eanist movement advance to a position where the president would consider it desirable to give it his personal endorsement.

All the momentum that was generated as a result of the commemoration services for the 10th anniversary of the revolution sponsored by the 25 April Association seems to point toward the ultimate formalization of such a movement. If only because this time, about 1 and 1/2 year away from having to leave Belem, time is running out on Eanes' period of maximum political influence. One difficulty, however, remains: the diversity of personalities engaged in Eanism, which extends from a Left that claims to inherit the purest principles of the MFA (those that were supported by the "Nine"), to an openly conservative national bourgeoisie. As was pointed out to us by one of the presidential party's supporters, "the centers of initiative attracted to the phenomenon are varied and diverse." It is clear that the logic of Eanism assigns ideology to a largely secondary position, in favor of the pragmatism of practical politics. But the great number of personalities from various quadrants that are converging upon the project will undoubtedly cause trouble in the movement's administrative organization.

Expectations in Belem

As happened with previous attempts, Belem accompanies the unfolding of events with expectancy. It is not giving the green light--or the red--but always a flashing yellow. And this time there is a novelty: among the principal promoters of the initiative no important national political figure stands out. They are local personalities that in 1980 gave their names and labors to the regional organizations of the CNARPE--such as Herminio Moutinho (Santarem), Alipio de Melo (Seia) and Dias de Carvalho (Castelo Branco). All its activities are dependent upon the prestige of Eanes. And the other Eanists follow the phenomenon with the same attention and expectancy as the president of the republic.

CNARPE elements are to finish this weekend a document with more specific proposals, to be submitted at a meeting planned for 30 June in Abrantes.

Party Formation Not Imminent

Sources associated with the movement assured us, however, that creation of a party at this time is by no means contemplated--much less at the Abrantes meeting. The document being prepared at this time, which its authors classify as "a basic discussion of the nation's situation," points out the current need to "alter the party spectrum," but for the present does not go beyond that.

Initially, the CNARPE intended to assemble a political front in support of a candidate for president in 1985. This candidate was to promise to dissolve the Assembly after being elected, then pulling the party into the legislative elections.

The momentum established last 25 April, however, went beyond these intentions. The Eanist Left emerged with growing vigor, not only with the popular support for the initiatives organized by Vasco Lourenco (in contrast with the indifference that greeted the official commemorations), but also with the high rating given Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo in straw voting.

Eanes then began to become concerned about the excessively populist character of the phenomenon, which was already beginning to get out of control, and Belem sources made it known that the former prime minister would not be the president's candidate. (See the last issue of EXPRESSO.)

CNARPE leaders modified their plans. Formation of the party became viewed as desirable even before the presidential elections. At the same time, some of the project's promoters sought to banish fears of "excessive populism," asserting that the movement's candidate would certainly not be "among the personalities rated highest in recent opinion polls"--in a clear allusion to Pintasilgo and Salgado Zenha. But, to avoid worsening divisions or splits, this position was no longer taken publicly.

Restricted Meeting

In any event, CNARPE leaders have decided to be cautious. The meeting at the end of this month in Abrantes will be quite restricted, permitting participation of only 4 members from each district (about 70), who will be joined by about 50 persons who were at the Tomar meeting.

On the other hand, no meeting with the president of the republic has yet been held or planned. One of the promoters of the initiative told us that direct contact will be made with Ramalho Eanes only after proof of significant national support for the movement. Likewise, only after all the foundation work has been accomplished will invitations be extended to the most prominent Eanist figures.

Eanes Awaits Information

The president of the republic, meanwhile, has decided not to adopt any stance toward the movement before obtaining direct information from its promoters. Moreover, he would not be willing to take part in any initiative while still exercising his powers in Belem. For this very reason he is facing the possibility of resigning his mandate if the movement should become consolidated in the intermediate term.

Despite everything, Eanes must be confiding to his collaborators that he sees no advantage in hastening events, since maintenance of the coalition until the end of 1985 is considered assured--an assurance that would result from the joint interests of Mario Soares (who needs the support of the Social Democrats for his candidacy) and Mota Pinto (whose political survival seems more and more dependent on the alliance with the secretary general of the Socialist Party).

Military Candidate

As for the candidate for president in 1985, the positions of Eanes and of the leaders of the CNARPE will coincide at one point: the advantage of a military man.

This despite the fact that some important Eanists (Jose Carlos Vasconcelos, for example) prefer the candidacy of Lourdes Pintasilgo.

The military men who have the best chance of obtaining the support of Ramalho Eanes are probably Loureiro dos Santos and Rocha Vieira. Belem sources, however, admit the possibility of the president giving his endorsement to another officer, who may appear to have better chances of winning, namely Firmino Miguel himself, should he agree to the candidacy program.

Curiously, sources close to the prime minister assert that the possibility of Mario Soares supporting his former defense minister in either the first or second round of the presidential elections is entirely out of the question.

Provincial, Lisbon Eanists Differ

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 23 Jun 84 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva in the column "Portuguese Politics": "Pintasilgo and the Eanists"]

[Text] Until a few weeks ago, it was believed that engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo would be the preferred candidate of the Eanists.

For three principal reasons.

In the first place, because she is an adviser of General Eanes and was his prime minister.

In the second place, because she ran well in all the opinion polls.

In the third place, because she is a woman, a Catholic and a progressive.

It so happened, however, that things did not work out exactly that way in the end.

Moreover: it has happened that in various sectors of Eanism there is, if not a personal hostility to engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, at least a clear rejection of her candidacy for president.

The explanation for this phenomenon must of course be sought in the makeup of "Eanism."

We shall say, to simplify things, that there are Eanists of two types: those who live in Lisbon and those who live in the provinces.

The Eanists of the provinces have, as a matter of principle, a visceral hostility toward everything from Lisbon.

To them, Lisbon represents corruption, vice and political immorality.

This is why the Eanists of the provinces are so suspicious of Dr Mario Soares: he, with his gimmicks, his fancy footwork, his backslapping, is the very incarnation of the "Lisbon politician."

In fact, the only thing that the Eanists of the provinces really like about Lisbon is Gen Ramalho Eanes.

And this is because Eanes, although he lives in the capital, lives secluded in his Palace of Belem--a little like Salazar lived secluded in his Sao Bento residence.

Both men, in fact, have taken a similar stance in politics: they confine themselves to the depths of their offices, believing that this frees them from the citified struggle for influence and enables them to get a clearer picture of the nation.

That is the way the Eanists would like to view Eanes--just as the provinces, despite everything, viewed Dr Salazar.

That is also why Eanists take a dim view of Pintasilgo.

It will be said that Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, being a woman from Lisbon, never belonged to the "political class" of the capital.

That is true.

But it is also true that she has her group, her friends, her co-workers, her confidants; now, what the Eanists of the provinces want for their candidate for president of the republic is not a figure already established in politics and who already has her own world--what the Eanists of the provinces want is a person who is theirs to establish and who for this reason depends above all upon them.

We shall see whether they succeed.

If they do succeed--that is, if they take over the party--the "Eanist Party" will be a party different from that about which everyone is thinking.

They have been thinking about a party formed by figures of Lisbon politics, unemployed or not from other political parties, who either wanted to promote themselves or sincerely saw in Eanes the solution for the nation's problems.

If the Eanists from the provinces take over, however, the party will be something else.

Above all, it will be a movement of revolt against the way in which politics is conducted in the capital.

It will be revenge for the provinces against Lisbon.

In this party, let it be noted, the personalities of the city's politics who for years have cajoled and wheedled the president and frequented the halls of Belem will certainly have no place of distinction.

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CSO: 3542/74

BRIEFS

EANES-OTELLO FRIENDSHIP--Speaking about the operations launched against the 25 April FP, Eanes said that "no new data have been provided to the president of the republic." He added that such data "should not even be provided, insofar as the president is concerned with the operation only in terms of the details." As to the possibility that Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho may be involved in the actions by the 25 April FP, Eanes said: "I am a friend of Lt Col Saraiva de Carvalho, but friendship has nothing to do with this matter." It will be recalled that in 1976, Eanes said that if Otelo were elected president, he himself would take his family out of the country. It was further stated that the Office of the Presidency of the Republic knew that the operation was under way at about 10 am that day. [Excerpt] [Lisbon 0 DIA in Portuguese 2 Jul 84 p 13] 5157

CSO: 3542/75

ANALYSIS OF POSTELECTORAL PSC-PSOE 'RADICALIZATION'

Madrid ABC in Spanish 21 Jun 84 p 27

[Commentary by Jordi Domenech: "PSC: 'Radicalization'"]

[Text] The debate that began in the PSC-PSOE [Socialist Party of Catalonia-Spanish Socialist Workers Party] after their electoral defeat on 29 April may result in a disturbing "radicalization" of the party on questions as important as the economic policy and the controversy as to whether Spain should remain in or withdraw from NATO. On both subjects, the sectors that are taking more critical positions with regard to the policy developed by the government of Felipe Gonzalez are those that are getting more publicity and that very probably will wield great influence at the next PSC-PSOE congress to be held next fall or at the end of the year, if it is finally decided to postpone it until after the 30th Congress of the PSOE has met.

As I pointed out on another occasion, influential leaders of Catalan socialism, Joaquin Nadal, mayor of Gerona, among them, are openly critical of the government's economic policy, believing as they do that the reduction of the public deficit and of inflation through the application of monetary measures is producing negative results for that sector of the population the majority of which voted for the PSOE on 28 October.

"Radicalization" has also made its appearance in the debate on the NATO question. The Socialist Federation of Barcelona openly and publicly supported the peace demonstration that took place in Madrid and that was denied the support of both the government and the PSOE itself. The decision of the Barcelona socialists caused concern in sectors close to the government because, in reality, it implied a posture clearly in opposition to Spain's remaining in NATO.

The Barcelona Federation of the PSC-PSOE also organized a debate on the NATO issue, in which representative Francisco Casares, attorney, and Jorge Garcia Petit, professor of international law, participated and in which it could be definitely seen that the sympathies of the socialist militants are with anyone who advocates Spain's withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Casares stated that the government must set up the referendum in clear terms and that it must include an unconfused question on Spain's remaining in or withdrawing from NATO, and that both the government and the PSOE must show that they are

unequivocally in favor of withdrawal. Casares added that he feared that the advocates of the pro-NATO position may gain control of the PSOE leadership. At the end of his presentation, he asked that the PSC-PSOE adopt a position definitely opposed to continued membership in NATO, indicating that, if necessary, Catalan socialists on this question will have to reaffirm their autonomy vis-a-vis the PSOE leadership.

Garcia Petit advocated, to the contrary, that the provisional nature of Spain's present status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization be maintained. As I have already pointed out above, this moderate posture is not the one that seems to reflect the feelings of the majority of the PSC-PSOE militants. Therefore, the risk that the electoral defeat is leading Catalan socialists toward a progressive "radicalization" is something more than a mere working hypothesis.

8089

CSO: 3548/280

COUNTRY SEEKS PERMANENT OBSERVER STATUS IN WEU

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 22-28 Jun 84 p 5

[Article by Ojvind Kyro]

[Excerpts] The Socialist government of France and the conservative government of West Germany are now working hard to revive the Western European Union (WEU), a defense collaboration involving seven nations from the NATO alliance. Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen told WEEKENDAVISEN he was pleased with the new WEU ambitions, while the Social Democrats adopted a wait-and-see attitude.

Paris--If power can be measured by the number of security guards, then the Western European Union has no power. The dozing, rosy-cheeked guard at the door leaves at quitting time, even if the mahogany-clad hall of parliament at Place Iena is still buzzing with the politicians' discussions of war and peace.

This week, however, the 189 delegates are debating more enthusiastically than ever before, for after 30 years of a shadowy existence, the seven member nations now intend to give the union some power. Last week, for the first time in 10 years, the foreign ministers met at the Council of Ministers, where they decided to make the Western European Union "the place" for European security policy.

After being an excuse for thinly disguised tourist trips by members of parliament and officials, WEU will now undergo a political heart massage and become a forum for the debate that Denmark and other countries have wanted to keep out of the EEC.

The foundation for WEU was put into place in 1948 when France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg signed the Treaty of Brussels. It was established out of the fear of renewed German aggression. WEU was created in 1954 when the treaty was amended and Italy and West Germany became members. Since then, WEU's most important goal has been to monitor the rearmament of West Germany.

To Be Or Not To Be In

The Danish government believes that the resurrection of this museum piece of defense policy is extremely important. Because of the strong obligations inherent in WEU--all for one and one for all--Denmark cannot become a member without a constitutional amendment. But Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party) said: "We are not interested in being kept out of the discussions at the WEU Council of Ministers. The only realistic solution for us is to become an observer at the council. For this reason, we are waiting for an offer from WEU."

The foreign minister's reason for seeking this close affiliation is as follows: "In our relations with every international forum we must choose whether we will demonstrate or whether we will exercise influence whether the action is. I see the revival of WEU as a warning to those who do not take our participation in international institutions seriously enough. After all, we cannot prevent other countries from forming their own organizations, if they do not want to talk to us."

This week, in order to keep up with events at WEU, two Danish politicians participated as observers at the annual meeting of the WEU parliamentary assembly in Paris. From their red seats in the very back of the hall, Lasse Budtz (Social Democrat) and Ole Bernt Henriksen (Conservative Party) and two of their Norwegian counterparts, have followed discussions by the seven member nations on joint security problems.

Unofficially, several WEU members have expressed satisfaction that the "footnote nation" Denmark is not a member of WEU. But Lasse Budtz is not worried: "In October the WEU foreign ministers will meet again in Rome. Either they will offer to include Denmark, Norway, Greece, Spain, and Portugal or they will announce that they are not interested, because WEU is involved only in the central region of Western Europe. But everyone--both the right and the left--agrees that Europe should have more to say. A more intense debate over the role of Europe is needed, now that the United States is distancing itself more and more from Europe. For this reason, we should wait and see what happens in Rome this October and not take a position until an offer is made. WEU is now miles away from the position of the Danish Social Democrats. It is rightist oriented and extremely militaristic. They speak only of deterrence and not of detente. But WEU will probably be used to achieve detente as well."

The Americans in Brussels believe that offering encouragement is the best way to go: "We welcome the revival of WEU, as long as it strengthens the Western European defense system," a spokesman said. "We do not see it as a competitor. Instead, we take the French leaders at their word when they say they simply want to strengthen the 'European pillar' of the alliance. But the Danish government has a difficult role to play in this matter, since its hands have been tied by a majority in parliament. This makes Denmark a difficult ally to work with."

A high-ranking Danish official expressed a similar position with regard to the international role of Denmark: "It will be damned difficult for us if, in the future, decisions are made at a table where we are excluded."

Another goal of WEU is to establish a joint European force that could be used, among other things, in the third world if the supply of strategically important raw materials is threatened. On this topic, Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen said: "As the world situation is today, it is a fact that such things are of importance to the Western World. If Denmark wants to pretend that these problems do not exist, then other countries will solve these problems for us by forming a club to which we do not belong."

"It is incredible that some people believe the Good Lord gave us permission to take whatever strategic raw materials we want," said Gert Petersen (Socialist People's Party). He does not object to Denmark's keeping up with events within WEU, "but the foreign minister is saying that, in reality, we would be an informal member. Instead, we should try to prevent WEU from becoming a new superpower. We have no use for more integration and dependence. I do not understand why we need to create a defense organization in Europe to distance ourselves from the policies of the United States."

"Wonderful"

The smaller NATO countries with political situations similar to that of Denmark are positive--even enthusiastic. The Dutch Social Democrat Klaas de Vries, who in his own parliament has opposed the deployment of the 572 American nuclear missiles, told WEEKENDAVISEN: "The revival of WEU is a wonderful thing. It is an excellent idea. For many years, we here in Europe have neglected our own security problems. For this reason, we should welcome any forum at which discussions can be held without the United States. Denmark should follow these events closely and speak with the WEU members in order to guarantee that no new power bloc is formed in Europe that excludes several countries."

9336

CSO: 3613/186

DEFENSE MINISTER SJAASTAD: COALITION UNIFIED ON DEFENSE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Jul 84 p 3

[Text] Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad emphasized to AFTENPOSTEN the value of the government cooperating as an effective team, and how important it is that the results of the cooperation reach out to the voters. "The unstrained and natural climate that the prime minister has created means much for the work. It is natural that the interests of all three coalition parties are taken care of. None of the coalition parties has been forced into anything."

Despite a serious development in the opinion polls, the minister is optimistic. "The two clear alternatives confronting next year's voters will gradually become more obvious. I have noticed that the Labor Party wants to create the impression that the party is now better off within itself than before. The question is only whether the country would be better off with the Labor Party in the government position.

"In a number of areas one can be satisfied with the results that the government has achieved so far. We have revised the economic policies with significantly less inflation, improved competitive ability, and we can clearly see a new mentality spreading in the country--a desire to invest," said Sjaastad.

"In the defense and security policy area we have conducted a policy since 1981 on which there was broad unity until the Labor Party came into the opposition. We have observed NATO's dual resolution of 1979, and we have kept to the obligations which are a part of our membership in the alliance. Norway has also avoided distinguishing itself within NATO with dissensions and footnotes," pointed out the defense minister, clearly referring to the Danish Government's apology to the majority in the Folketing, ordered by the Social Democrats.

"Almost the entire time we have met with opposition from the Labor Party since that party abandoned the policy which it followed when it was in the

government position. Even after the spring agreement in the Storting the Labor Party adhered to the NATO dual resolution. Norway depends on our allies standing by their obligations in a crisis or a war situation. Therefore we should be the last to avoid our own obligations to the alliance, as the Labor Party is doing over the missile issue.

"But on the other hand it is good that the Labor Party has recently followed a responsible line on many questions, with unambiguous assurances of the value of the country's NATO membership. Further there is broad unity on the need for a strong defense within the alliance, and that the initiatives and actions should be coordinated with our allies.

"It is also useful that the concept of the nuclear-free zones is included in a broader East/West connection. The only navigable way to go is to see the question of nuclear-free zones in connection with a larger agreement. The importance of a balance of strength in conventional weapons has also been emphasized as a precondition for NATO becoming less dependant on nuclear weapons in its war-preventing strategy," said Minister Sjaastad.

The defense minister reminded that the government, in its work on the disarmament question, has emphasized active international participation with ideas and perspectives. "Here also our influence is greatest when we have proved that what Norway stands for will advance the common goal of the alliance.

"Personally, I therefore believe that the Labor Party has received too much credit for the spring agreement. We could have been much smarter in presenting the basis for the rebuilt unity," said Sjaastad.

The minister admitted that that was an example showing that information about the government's work must be reemphasized until the Storting election. "We who live with politics 24 hours a day are not always clear about how quickly people can forget what was done a short time ago. I know that the entire government and the coalition parties realize that, and that in the future we must give a clear message without getting lost in unnecessary details," he emphasized.

The coalition parties clearly are confident that the government's mandate can be renewed. And the minister concluded, "I cannot see that the so-called new self-confidence of the Labor Party has any foundation in the alternatives that the opposition has proposed."

9287
CSO: 3639/135

ARMED FORCES CHIEF WANTS GREATER MOBILITY IN INVASION DEFENSE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 6 Jun 84 p 9

[Article by Roger Magnergard]

[Text] Swedish invasion defense will be maintained. But the units must be made more mobile.

So says Lennart Ljung, supreme commander of the Swedish Armed Forces [OB], in the new prospective plan that he will submit to the government today, Wednesday.

Technical developments are the most important reason for the new policy. The big powers now have the ability to move large numbers of troops quickly.

This applies especially to commando units--also called diversionary units--that may number thousands of men. Those fully equipped elite soldiers, who lack only the heaviest weapons, are usually air dropped at their objective.

The OB does not provide a ready answer to the question of how those troops are to be confronted.

He does say, however, that a lighter armored infantry vehicle is an interesting possibility.

That particular question has divided the army into two camps--one advocating a new tank and the other preferring the armored infantry vehicle.

The OB also points out that there must be better preparedness. Various solutions are presented, but the recommended one calls for a wider dispersion of conscript training.

In his plan, Lennart Ljung also notes that the militarily important area of northern Scandinavia has been receiving even more attention from the big powers.

This is because of NATO's altered view of the Soviet buildup on the Kola Peninsula. The West has 5,000 men stationed permanently in northern Norway. On

the opposite side, the Soviet Union may have about 100,000 troops, 1,500 aircraft, and 150 submarines on the Kola Peninsula.

Both sides can bring up reinforcements quickly.

In light of that, the OB feels that the Swedish units must be made increasingly mobile.

Concerning the submarine intrusions, Lennart Ljung writes that the Armed Forces should be strengthened to such a point in the future that foreign powers will realize how senseless it is to violate our borders.

According to TT [PRESS WIRE SERVICE, INC.], however, the government will soon instruct the OB to submit a combined plan for future Swedish antisubmarine measures in the event of new submarine incidents.

That plan is to be ready in October, by which time the OB will have analyzed the current financial, tactical, operational, technical, and material resources for antisubmarine measures.

11798

CSO: 3650/228

FORMER KARLSKRONA BASE COMMANDER COMMENTS ON U 137 INCIDENT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Jun 84 p 3

[Op-Ed article by Lennart Forsman]

[Text] Navy Capt Lennart Forsman is a former commander of the naval base in Karlskrona.

Some time back Prisma published "The Submarine Threat," a book in which Anders Hasselbohm critically examined the Submarine Committee's report following the intrusions in Hars Bay in 1982. In one chapter he also touched on the grounding of U 137.

The book was a disappointment to me because of Hasselbohm's method of reasoning and the weakness of his argument. The book is merely a collection of quotations in which Hasselbohm one-sidedly chose quotations and excerpts that support the conclusion he has adopted. "The Submarine Threat" is less than valuable to anyone interested in the submarine intrusions.

Hasselbohm has now also published an article in the "Focus" column that appeared on 9 June. It, too, consists mainly of quotations and of summaries from his book.

I have no firsthand knowledge of the incident in Hars Bay. But my profession has given me some insight into what happened there. That, plus my respect for and confidence in the experience and integrity of Sven Andersson, has convinced me of the correctness of the committee's conclusions. The committee's makeup and its other members inspire the same confidence and strengthen faith in the report.

Knows What Happened

Hasselbohm is also critical of the statement that U 137 intentionally penetrated the restricted military area in Gase Bay. He seems to believe that it was an accident caused by a fault in the navigation equipment. I was commander of the naval base in Karlskrona when U 137 went aground, and I know what happened in that instance. I have no reason to carry on a controversy with Hasselbohm--for his own reasons, he is certainly convinced that he is right--

but it may be of interest to SVENSKA DAGBLADET's readers to acquaint themselves in a very summary fashion with some of the facts made public so far.

First, U 137 went aground while veering to port, not while it was on a straight course. This shows that the submarine was engaged in making the turn required at Torum Skerry if one intends to enter Gase Bay. The problem was that U 137 made the turn one-tenth of a nautical mile too late, and that was why it went aground.

Second, the big coastal beacon at Utklippan must have been visible from U 137 (the beacon is 31 meters high, and its light can be seen for 41 kilometers), since U 137 passed very close to it. And if the beacon can be seen, no one skilled in navigation can be in doubt about where he is. One's position can also be determined by using radar to examine the shape of the coastline. But U 137 was not using its radar, since it knew that radar transmissions would immediately have alerted Swedish radio intelligence to the presence of a Whiskey submarine in Swedish territorial waters.

Completely Out of the Question

Third, about 1 kilometer before it went aground, U 137 passed through the sound between Flagg and Boke Skerries. The sound is about 300 meters wide. It is completely out of the question that the Russians did not see land and realize that they were no longer in the open sea.

Fourth, after going aground, the Russians tampered with their logbook to mislead investigating personnel concerning the submarine's course and intentions. They would scarcely have done so if the grounding had really been an accident.

In my opinion, all of that is enough to show that the grounding was not an accident due to a fault in the navigation equipment, but an intentional penetration of the restricted military area. It is doubtful whether the presentation of any further facts would influence those critics who have already decided to believe that it was a matter of poor navigation. They have chosen to place greater faith in the Soviet submarine commander's statements than in the official Swedish report on what happened. They are therefore ignoring, perhaps unconsciously, the fact that Captain Guschin did everything possible--including falsifying the logbook--to make it look as though what happened was unintentional.

Guschin stated that before going aground, the submarine was moving on power from its diesel engines. Maybe it was. All we know, however, is that Guschin said it was. The critics have chosen to focus on that and play with words to strengthen their argument. They say that U 137 was moving "with diesel engines roaring." They almost make it sound as though the islands were shaking from the sound waves. The fact is that a submarine diesel engine can be heard, but not as well as other kinds of diesel engines. Submarines and their engines are built, for natural reasons, to be as quiet as possible, since quiet movement is their way of protecting themselves from antisubmarine measures. Their engines are therefore insulated to reduce the sound level.

The propagation of sound in the air varies, depending on the layer of air and temperature. Sometimes it is anomalous, and then the sound can be heard over a great distance. In the area in question in Gase Bay, I myself have sometimes heard ships that were beyond the horizon and therefore not visible (over 20 kilometers away). It is possible that such an anomaly was occurring when U 137 went aground--weather conditions at the time do not rule out the possibility--and if so, people on land might have heard the sound of shipping and fishing vessels around Utklippan that they later thought had come from U 137.

On the other hand, if sound propagation was normal on the evening in question (and this is most probably the case), it would not have been possible to hear a diesel-powered submarine moving at 8 knots for as long as the critics say that people heard the sound of the engine. If we assume that the submarine's engine was heard at a distance of 1 nautical mile (barely 2 kilometers)--a greater distance than usual in the case of submarine diesel engines--it would have been impossible to hear it from land for more than 7 minutes at most. It is therefore probable that the observers heard something else (shipping around Utklippan or naval helicopters).

Surprised

Hasselbohm expresses surprise at the fact that the Submarine Committee mentioned the major Soviet exercises in the Baltic Sea, but not NATO's 1982 "Northern Wedding" and "Bold Guard" exercises. But the purpose of the NATO exercises was antisubmarine warfare in the North Sea and the Atlantic, a landing on the west coast of Jutland, and defense of the Baltic Sea outlet to prevent Soviet warships during wartime from moving out of the Baltic into the North Atlantic, where they could attack NATO's shipping. As a result, NATO exercises are not of direct interest to Sweden. On the other hand, they ordinarily end with naval visits to North European ports, and Sweden and even Finland have sometimes been visited on those occasions. Hasselbohm is also playing with words when he calls them "giant NATO exercises."

On the other hand, the four Warsaw Pact exercises mentioned by the Submarine Committee as taking place in the Baltic in recent years ("Mishka" in June 1980, "Waffenbruederschaft" in September 1980, "Soyuz" in March 1981, and "Zapad" in September 1981) were major exercises. On those occasions, the Soviet Union practiced seaborne landings of a size and scope not seen since the Normandy landing in 1944. Ships from the four Soviet fleets were brought together in the Baltic Sea. The fact that the Soviet Union has built up those immense landing fleets and regularly conducts exercises with them in the Baltic proves, in any event, that seaborne landings must be a part of their operational planning in the Baltic area. It is therefore natural that the committee should mention them.

Those exercises, like NATO exercises when they touch on our immediate vicinity, are closely followed by our military, chiefly to ensure that Swedish territory is not violated.

Anonymous Source

Hasselbohm claims in conclusion that NATO was also involved in the Hars Bay incident. He became convinced of that on the basis of information from an anonymous source which said that a damaged NATO submarine had passed through the Sound submerged after the incident in Hars Bay. According to Hasselbohm, the submarine had been damaged by a Swedish mine. The anonymous source quoted by Hasselbohm can scarcely be well informed, considering that because of the depth conditions in the Sound, it is physically impossible for a submarine to pass through it in a submerged position. It is too shallow!

In recent years there have been a number of attention-getting submarine violations of Swedish waters. Two of them--U 137 and Hars Bay in 1982--were determined by Swedish authorities to have been violations by the Soviets. In both cases, the Swedish Government issued a strong protest to Moscow. In the case of other violations that attracted a great deal of attention in the mass media (Ut Island, Sundsvall, Tore, Karlskrona in August-September 1983 and Karlskrona in the winter of 1984), it was not possible to determine the nationality involved.

Only one power--the Soviet Union--can know for sure whether those violations were carried out by Soviet submarines or not. Moscow knows how matters stand. If the violations were the work of Soviet submarines, it is natural that Moscow should deny it (which is precisely what General Milstein told Ambassador Ferm) and ridicule the Swedish assertions instead.

If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union was not guilty of those violations, Moscow knows that, too. And if this is the case, then the serious thing is that Moscow also knows that some other power--and it must be from NATO--is systematically violating Swedish territory with submarines. And that the power in question is doing so in the inland sea which the Soviets consider that they dominate and which is consequently of vital interest to them.

It would therefore have been natural for the Soviets to react very strongly if they had had reason to believe that NATO submarines were operating in Swedish archipelagos--since indirectly, those operations must have been directed against the Soviet Union.

And we know how the Soviet Union has reacted to the submarine violations.

11798

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BOFORS ACCUSED OF ILLEGALLY EXPORTING L-70 CANNONS TO IRAN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Jun 84 p 8

[Excerpt] Bofors has delivered cannons to Iran. Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association Vice Chairman Lars Angstrom made this allegation at Friday's Center Party youth meeting in Umea.

"We have already reported one instance of weapons smuggling by Bofors to the police. We are presently deciding whether to report this case to the police as well," said Lars Angstrom. "Our inside source at Bofors has reported that the company management will go to any lengths in their attempt to circumvent the established guidelines for Swedish weapons exports in order to make a sale."

Information concerning the latest weapons smuggling activities was published in an interview with inside sources at Bofors which appeared in the Swedish peace organization's newspaper, PAX. This case involves the 57 mm L-70 automatic cannon, which Bofors is said to have smuggled into Iran via Yugoslavia. The Swedish Navy's Spica boats are equipped with the L-70 guns, which have a range of 14 km. These cannons can also be modified for rocket ammunition.

Lars Angstrom is of the opinion that neither this transaction with Iran nor the one which was made with Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates (the first instance reported to the police) was any sort of "accidental" occurrence.

"In Bofors management 37 persons knew about the deal with Bahrein and the Emirates," he says. "It is hard to believe that the company executives weren't also aware of this one."

"Smoke Screen"

Angstrom is highly critical of the government's supervision of weapons exports.

"The political willpower is lacking," he claims. "The proposal concerning a parliamentary advisory committee is nothing more than a smoke screen. The Foreign Relations Committee should function in an advisory capacity."

Andreas Karlgren, the Center Party youth group's newly-elected chairman, explained that demands that the exportation of all weapons be halted have reached a new high. The youth group plans to make up the question with the Center Party.

According to the PAX source at Bofors, the Iranian deal is similar in scope to the previous transaction with Bahrein and the Arab Emirates. A total weapons transaction of roughly 100 million Swedish kroner is in question, not a particularly large sum in the world of international weapons trade.

The Iranian transaction was mediated through several Yugoslavian middlemen. It has not been possible to determine just when the deal took place, except that it occurred several years ago.

Chemical Plant

At Bofors shareholders' meeting last week, it was revealed that construction of the company's chemical plant in Iran has been resumed. Construction had been discontinued when the Shah was overthrown in 1979, at which time Bofors recalled its employees. The economic conflicts between Bofors and the new regime have now been resolved. The large plant should be completed by the end of 1985.

Among other activities, manufacturing at the plant will provide raw materials for explosives.

Astrid Eliasson, Vice Chairman of the International Association of Women for Peace and Freedom (IKFF), demanded an explanation regarding the plant.

8954

CSO: 3650/230

BRIEFS

ROBOT 15 MISSILES DELIVERED--When Saab Missiles in Linköping, a member company in Saab-Combitech, delivered its new Robot 15 naval missiles to the Navy on Thursday the project was already a multimillion kronor success. The Navy's Norrköping-Class Spica boats are equipped with six Robot 15 missile launchers, in addition to modern torpedos. The 12-boat project is worth nearly 500 million Swedish kronor. The Finnish Navy has placed orders totalling 300 million kronor for Robot 15 missiles. The Swedish Air Force is planning a version of the Robot 15 for use on their JAS 39-Gripen, with delivery scheduled to commence in 1992. At present, this order is worth 600 million kronor. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 8 Jun 84 p 27]

DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN ELECTRONICS CONCERNS AGENCY--Sweden's dependency on foreign countries in the electronics sector must be given more attention than it is presently getting. It may become as important to be able to purchase electronic components from foreign countries during the '90's as it is for us to be able to purchase foreign oil now. So maintains the Agency for Economic Defense (EF) in the future perspective report which is now presenting to the government. The OEF also points out that rapid social and, in particular, economic development has necessitated an adjustment in our economic defenses. After making a study of economic development and its effects on our ability to provide for our own needs, the OEF feels that those who are involved in dealing with problems which pertain to this ability may require a new level of competence in the future. Increasing internationalization of production is assumed. The economy's international dependency and vulnerability increase accordingly. "We must build functional reliability and limited vulnerability into our economy right from the start," claims the OEF. "This means that economic decision-makers in the public and private sectors must take greater responsibility to ensure that consideration is given to our ability to provide for ourselves, even in the development of our peacetime economy. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 13 Jun 84 p 6] 8954

CSO: 3650/230

WILLOCH GOVERNMENT RECORD IN ECONOMY, ENERGY EXAMINED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jun 84 p 3

[Article by Morten Malmo: "Increased Welfare, More Unemployment"]

[Text] After three-fourths of the present Storting period has gone by, Prime Minister Kare Willoch and his government can say that one is on the way toward realizing several important goals: Prices are going down, the tax level is sinking, the number of jobs is increasing, oil income is rising, the gross national product is rising, and the social security budgets are higher than ever. But there is also a minus side to the nonsocialist coalition government. The most obvious items are that unemployment has risen since 1981, that interest rates have risen, that ability to compete abroad has not increased much, and that housing construction is on the way down. Nor is the new private share system for doctor visits popular.

AFTENPOSTEN has obtained some information that tells to what extent the government has been successful in its policy or not. We have concentrated on areas that affect most of us -- and also on the most important things, both on the plus and minus side. The figures presented were obtained from government documents, from the Finance Department, from the Department of Municipal Affairs, the Department of Social Affairs, the Central Bureau of Statistics, Norway's Bank, and the Labor Department.

What most of us have noticed is that price increases have declined sharply. In 1981, price increases were 13.6 percent in spite of price controls during much of the year. In 1982 prices rose 11.3 percent, in 1983 8.4 percent, and the most recent figure from May showed that prices are now rising at "only" 6.6 percent.

In three budgets up to now the government has proposed and obtained real tax reductions. The total tax and duty level is declining in Norway. The limits on saving with a tax reduction have increased, and stock saving with a tax reduction has been introduced.

Growth in the gross national product (GNP) was 0.9 percent in 1981. Last year the growth was 3.2 percent, and this year it is expected to be two percent.

The number of persons employed is rising. In 1981 1,932,000 Norwegians had steady work. Last year the figure rose to 1,957,000. A further increase is expected this year. Is it possible that next year two million Norwegians will have steady work?

The government's income from oil activities has increased from 27.2 billion kroner in 1981 to 32.6 billion kroner this year.

Government payments to insurance, health service, and social goals was 57 billion kroner in 1982. This year the payments are increasing to 67 billion kroner. Family allowance has risen significantly. Pensions as well.

In a survey such as this one, it is natural to include a few important changes in legislation, and here two "banner headlines" stand out clearly, namely the simplification and liberalization of housing legislation and the break with the monopoly of the Norwegian Broadcasting Company. Housing turnover has become easier, people's possibility for the selection of type of ownership has been expanded, and the price mechanism can affect the housing market to a greater extent than before. The break with the Norwegian Broadcasting Company monopoly means that people can now see satellite TV and local TV and hear local radio.

Furthermore, revaluation has been reintroduced, and rules for compensation for expropriation have been changed so that the market value becomes the starting point when property is relinquished.

Both the purely Conservative Party government and the three-party government have fulfilled Norway's NATO commitments. The defense budget has grown at 3.5 percent a year. This year Norway is contributing 1.15 percent of the gross national product to aid to developing countries.

The government has received a green light from the Storting to increase exploration for oil and gas, particularly in the northern Norwegian shelf. A reform that will certainly increase popular influence on Statoil will go into effect at year's end. A new church regulation has been introduced. It means that authority is delegated to church organs. Educational capacity in secondary schools has increased strongly, particularly in trade courses. Various public regulations have been reduced from 26,000 to 8,000. Long-time unemployed are assured per diem payments for 80 weeks compared to 40 weeks up to now.

Even if the total number of jobs in Norway is increasing, Norway has experienced during Willoch's governmental period greater unemployment than at any time since the time between the wars.

In 1981 there were 28,438 registered unemployed in this country. The record came last year when 63,549 Norwegians were unemployed if we look at the year as a whole. The last survey this year, namely the May figures, say that 59,200

Norwegian are now unemployed.

In addition to this, there is also a strong growth in the number included in the so-called labor market enterprise, that is, re-schooling and training, special occupation, and similar things. Here the figure was 16,922 in 1981. At present the enterprises include a good 40,000 persons.

On its "lebit register" the government must also list that many fewer dwellings are being built than before. If one looks at the number of housing units begun, that is, building activity, construction has declined from 36,000 units in 1981, 37,000 units in 1982, to 31,500 units last year.

Interest rates have been high in the past two to three years -- an estimated 12 to 13 percent, and this has made it "expensive" for people to borrow money, even with our favorable deduction rates. Real interest rates, that is, the difference between the interest rate and price increase, have risen. In 1981 price increases were one percent higher than interest rates. In 1982 price increases began to decline, and real interest then became 1.7 percent, in 1983 3.9 percent. This year the real interest rate can approach six percent, and this means that the interest rate lies six percent higher than the price increase.

The private share system for payment for health services the Storting passed in connection with the community health law this spring is hardly one of the government's most popular initiatives. The system itself has been criticized as well as the amount of the maximum private share.

There are also "lines" in various parts of the health services, for example, to a sanitarium and to have certain operations, and this brings the government's judgment in question, even if the local authorities must bear their share of the responsibility for this.

One of the government's main objectives has been to achieve a policy that would strengthen Norway's ability to compete abroad so that one would increase productivity and have more secure jobs. From 1982 to 1983 Norwegian industry increased its competitive ability, but not as much as the government had hoped for. This year's wage negotiations indicate, according to the experts, that Norwegian industry's competitive ability abroad will again take a turn for the worse.

9124

CSO: 9639/125

NATION'S INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION GROWTH LAGGING BEHIND NEIGHBORS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jun 84 p 5

[Article by Thomas Knutzen: "Weak Home Industry"]

[Text] What has happened to growth in industrial production? The figures for April from the Central Bureau of Statistics have caused worry in the ranks of the economists. While industrial production in our neighboring countries is picking up with growth rates of five and six percent, it looks more and more as if the pessimists will be right that industrial production in Norway will scarcely rise at all from 1983 to 1984. While the export industries are already producing what they can, the home market industries are showing a weak development.

Great attention is being paid to developments in industrial production. Without industrial progress it will be even more difficult to reduce unemployment in the future.

The most recent official estimate of how strongly industrial production will increase is in the revised national budget presented in May. There the Finance Department estimates the growth to be about 1.5 percent. The economists in the bank union expect a growth of between two and three percent, while the industrial union earlier predicted zero growth.

The figures for industrial production in the year's first four months show a growth of 1.4 percent from the same period last year, but if one compares the seasonally corrected figures, the period from February to April shows a decline from the previous three month period of November to January. This decline is as much as 1.7 percent, and this is what sent out the shock waves.

Great Variation

Behind these figures there is a wide spread from industrial branch to industrial branch, and the development has particularly made industrial spokesmen to point out that Norwegian cost and structural problems coming out in full strength after the international upswing has carried the Norwegian export industry along with it. The industries that show a weak development are all oriented toward the Norwegian home market. Two of the industries that have

registered the strongest decline are directed toward markets that have more or less lasting problems. The shipbuilding industry has noticed little of the international upswing and is struggling with its deepgoing structural problems. The construction goods industry is feeling the decline in construction here in Norway.

At the Limit

Up to now the picture has been marked by progress in the export industry. "We are now practically at the limit of our capacity," Administrative Director Arne Festervoll of the National Organization of Electrochemical and Electro-metallurgical Industries said. The long name hides the fact that he represents the industries that need power, industries such as aluminum, ferro-alloys, and magnesium. In some of the smelting factories that have had a very large increase in demand, investments are being made that will increase capacity. But the total picture is still that in the future one cannot count on any significant production growth in these industries.

"The use of power also confirms that we are at maximum production," Festervoll says, pointing out that these industries this year will use about 34 billion kWh, and this is a whole five billion kWh more than they have definite agreements for the delivery of. This year is all right because of a particularly good water delivery, but in a normal year the power supply will be a limiting factor.


In the official statistics, shipbuilding is included in the transportation group, which in the first four months of this year had a production that was only 82 percent of the 1980 level. Only textiles and clothing have had a worse decline. The reduction in the shipbuilding industry is about to pull down the whole total figure. Without shipbuilding, industrial production would probably show a clear growth from 1983 to 1984, but there is a somewhat distant problem. The shipyard industry with the exception of shipbuilding shows a weak growth this year compared with the same period last year. But the growth in the production of metal goods, machines, and electrical appliances is more than outweighed by the decline in shipbuilding.

Another sector noting a decline is producers of heavy building materials for new construction. Norcem's half-year report, which will be published in a short time, will show a decline in the sale of cement and Leca blocks. But the concern will be able to maintain the same profitability as in the first part of last year because they have reduced costs and workers.

Here at home the textile and clothing industry and the forestry goods industry are losing ground. They are industries that have a lot of competition from foreign industry, not the least from our neighboring countries.

The branch divisions of pluses and minuses in industrial production in the year's first four months show that the food industry, which is either an exporting fishing industry or a well-protected farming industry, has a production growth. Besides this sector, it is only the typical export industries,

wood products, chemistry, and metal, that have increased their production.



Growth or decline in industrial production in various industries from January to April of this year, compared with the same period last year. Changes are indexed on the basis, 1980 = 100.

Key:

1. Industrial Production
2. Food
3. wood products
4. Chemical
5. Metal
6. textiles
7. Lumber
8. Mineral
9. Workshop
10. Shipbuilding
11. Other Industry

9124

190: 3639/128

CENTRAL BANK: TRADE SURPLUS TO BE HIGHER THAN PREDICTED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Jun 84 p 33

[Article by Bjorn H. Tretvoll: "Over 20 Billion in Surplus"]

[Text] Norway's central bank indicates in its most recent economic survey that important sectors of the Norwegian economy can develop more favorably this year than the authorities calculated in the Revised National Budget. The surplus in Norwegian foreign trade will set a new record this year, coming up over 20 billion kroner. Unemployment will in the meantime remain at about the same level in 1985 as well.

In the first quarter of this year economic development in Norway was somewhat weaker than predicted. But the most recent indicators suggest that a somewhat stronger growth in private investments and in consumption in the course of 1984 can replace demand from abroad as the most important force behind economic development. This can give stronger growth than predicted in private consumption, industrial production, import of goods, and in export of traditional goods.

In the meantime, the competitive level of Norwegian industry will show a clear turn for the worse in the course of 1984. With an unchanged rate of exchange through the year, the weakening of competitive ability from 1983 to 1984 will be limited to half a percentage point. Without changes in the rate of exchange, wage growth from 1984 to 1985 must be held under 5.5 percent to avoid a further worsening in the competitive position of Norwegian industry, Norway's bank estimates.

The bank predicts a growth in industrial production in 1984 of about two percent, but stresses the weak development that characterizes the domestic and protected sector of Norwegian industry. Norway's bank says that developments show that these problems will not be solved by the international economic upswing. It points out that while industrial production in our most important markets abroad has risen by 6.5 percent in the past 12 months, the corresponding rise here at home is not more than one percent.

Norway's bank agrees with the government's prediction that the price increase from 1983 to 1984 will be 6.5 percent. Next year there will be a price rise of about six percent.

The positive development in the labor market so far this year should make it possible to reduce the extent of labor market initiatives. The growth in employment last year came completely within the public sector. Norway's bank thinks this gives reason for serious concern that the development in the long run will be that market-oriented employment in the private sector will continue to stagnate. Unemployment in 1985 will hardly come much lower than the present level of about 65,000.

The export value of oil and gas can be about ten billion kroner higher than the authorities have predicted in 1984. This is the main reason for the expected record surplus in the operating balance abroad. Norway's bank also predicts a significant surplus in 1985.

The growth in private consumption is estimated at between 2.0 and 2.5 percent in 1984. Next year this figure can increase by one to two percent. Industrial investments will grow by ten percent from 1983 to 1984, and it looks as if there will be an even greater increase in 1985. In 1985 industrial production can have an upswing of between two and three percent.

Norway's bank has little faith that the average wage growth from 1983 to 1984 can be held within the limit of 5.9 percent, which was laid as the basis for this spring's income negotiations. The hourly wage increase is predicted to be 6.5 percent. Productivity will probably increase by 3.5 percent, and this will give a growth in wage costs per produced unit of three percent.

9124

CEO: 3639/128

BRIEFS

YOUTH JOBS PROGRAM BEING READIED--The struggle against unemployment among youth will be intensified. Prime Minister Kare Willoch has announced new government initiatives. He indicates, among other things, that there will be an arrangement for practice positions both in private and public activity, mainly financed by the public sector. The prime minister pointed out, among other things, that unemployment among youth has been reduced from 9,000 in January to 6,000 in May. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Jun 84 p 33] 9124

INFLATION DANGER CITED--In spite of a modest price increase from April to May of only 0.1 percent, there is danger that the pace of Norwegian price rises will increase somewhat toward the end of the present year. The Norwegian Bank Union predicts a price increase from 1983 to 1984 of seven percent, while the authorities' most recent predictions lie at 6.5 percent. With such a development, it can become difficult to achieve a further decline in price increases in 1985. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jun 84 p 6] 9124

030: 3639/128

LOWERING OF INTEREST RATE SEEN POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC MEASURE

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 24 Jun 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Symbolic Gesture"]

[Text] The government's decision to lower interest rates on short-term bank loans (less than 1 year) by 1 percentage point may be considered a merely symbolic gesture. It is, in fact, a political act with psychological objectives which the nation's economic and financial situation at present would not advise: inflation remains high, being expected to exceed 30 percent, while trends in foreign markets, as observed recently in the United States, are in the direction of new highs in interest rates. The measure was thus intended almost exclusively to serve as a "reference point" for the government's intentions in this area.

It is known that one of the major demands of Portuguese businessmen has been for lower interest rates. These remain very high, especially because inflation, contrary to the government's purposes, shows no sign of retreating. Of course, the authorities cannot tinker too much with interest rates on bank loans, because they would thereby also be lowering interest rates on bank deposits. If interest rates on deposits fall below the level of inflation, savers, seeing no "real" return on their capital, will of course seek other sources of income, at home or abroad. Capital flight would then be inevitable, further aggravating the already worrisome problems of bank profits.

The first question posed is this: it is necessary to combat inflation, lowering it to levels near those in industrialized countries. But an easing in the rate of price increases, which should have top priority in short-term economic policy, is not attained through a more-or-less artificial control: it is really attained through an increase in productivity. We shall probably continue to live with high rates of inflation...

This leads to a second question: in a period of high domestic inflation such as at present business firms cannot get the self-financing they need to meet their financial needs (increased costs of raw materials, higher salaries and financial costs due to investment charges). New investments are thus put at risk. Put differently, credit, expensive and hard to get, is the almost exclusive source of investment. A substantial fall for the latter compromises any stabilization program, development and future welfare.

Yet a third question arises: that of efficient and profitable operation of the banking system. It is known that the situation of the majority of our nationalized banks is not good, for several reasons: political "influence," deficient management, submission to objectives imposed by the macroeconomic policy (fixed interest rates, credit ceilings, granting of "privileged" credit often beyond the limits of economic and financial rationality), inappropriate size or specialization.

The reduction of interest rates and their liberalization for medium- and long-term deposits (the latter measure of problematical effectiveness, to increase the banks' maneuvering room) was, above all, a decision intended to achieve a certain psychological impact among businessmen. The latter may not have been satisfied, although there is little more the government could have done, for now, in this regard. Reestablishment of confidence, for both businessmen and savers, undoubtedly comes about through government action; but it also, obviously, comes about through fundamental measures. Let us hope that they are contemplated in the announced program of economic and financial recovery, now that the agreement with the IMF is concluded, when the "18-month emergency period" begins to draw to a close.

8834

CSO: 3542/77

JANUARY-MAY BALANCE OF TRADE DEFICIT INCREASE

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 21-28 Jun 84 p 19

[Text] Portugal's trade-balance deficit increased 9 percent in the January-through-May period of this year, compared with the same period of the previous year, O JORNAL learned from a reliable source.

This change reverses the trend followed since the end of 1982 by the foreign-trade balance, which had clearly indicated a reduction in the trade deficit.

Between 1982 and 1983, the foreign-trade deficit was reduced 9.7 percent (from 422.2 million contos to 380.9 million contos, that is, by 42 million contos), whereas between 1981 and 1982 it had increased 19.9 percent.

From January through March, the deficit was reduced 19 percent in comparison with the first quarter of 1983 (from 109.9 million contos to 88.9 million contos, a decrease of 21 million contos) and in the first 4 months of this year the same trend continued, although less sharply: the deficit was reduced by 7.5 percent, falling from 139.4 million contos to 128.8 million contos (a decrease of 11 million contos).

The increase of Portugal's trade deficit resulted from a general increase of imports. Among other things, it caused the previously favorable balance with the EEC (a surplus of 7.4 million contos in the first 4 months of 1984) to disappear, giving rise once again to a deficit with that economic bloc.

As a result, the rate of coverage fell 3 percentage points, so that it is now about 60 percent. The rate of coverage fell 2 percentage points between March and April, from 65.5 percent to 63.1 percent.

8834

CSO: 3542/77

SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN TRADE WITH JAPAN NOTED

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 28 Jun 84 p 30

[Excerpt] Japan absorbs, on the average, 1 percent of all Portuguese exports, while Japanese exports represent 3 percent of our imports. This ratio has remained relatively unchanged since the beginning of the 1970 decade.

As an article in the BOLETIM INFORMATIVO of the Luso-Japanese Chamber of Commerce notes, it should not pass unnoticed that in 1983 the ratio of "Portuguese imports from Japan/total Portuguese imports" came closer to the ratio of "Portuguese exports to Japan/total Portuguese exports," resulting not only from the increase of our sales abroad but also from the decline, in real terms, of purchases from abroad. "This is a direct consequence of the competitiveness of Portuguese products and also of the recession affecting the nation," the article comments.

Our trade deficit with Japan fell 14.5 percent in 1983; at the same time that our imports remained unchanged, exports increased 108.8 percent. As a result, the rate of coverage of imports by exports in Luso-Japanese trade doubled (from 12 percent to 25 percent). Portugal, however, continues to import from Japan four times as much as it exports to that country.

In regard to the current year, available statistics show a sharp drop in nominal terms (15.8 percent for imports and 14.3 percent for exports), contrary to the trend for the trade balance as a whole.

January-February Luso-Japanese Trade Balance (in Thousands of Contos)

Year	Imports		Exports		Balance		Coverage Rate (Exports/Imports) x 100
	Amount	(A)	Amount	(A)	Amount	(A)	
1983	4,456	-	868	-	-3,588	-	19.5 percent
1984	3,755	-15.8	744	-14.3	-3,011	16.0	19.8 percent

(A) Percentage increase (or decrease) in relation to previous year

Source: INE [National Statistics Institute], in BOLETIM INFORMATIVO of the Luso-Japanese Chamber of Commerce

Luso-Japanese Trade Balance (in Thousands of Contos)

ANOS (1)	IMPORTAÇÕES (2)		EXPORTAÇÕES (3)		SALDOS (4)		TAXA COBERTURA (5)
	Valor (6)	A	Valor (6)	A	Valor (6)	A	(Exp./Imp.) 100
1970	1 167	-	227	-	- 940	-	19.5
1971	1 408	20	199	-14	-1 209	-28	14.1
1972	1 815	29	290	46	-1 526	-26	16
1973	3 143	73	774	166	-2 369	-55	24.6
1974	3 596	14	896	16	-2 700	-14	24.9
1975	3 272	-10	465	-48	-2 807	- 4	14.2
1976	4 047	24	630	35.5	-3 417	-22	15.6
1977	7 173	77	722	14.5	-6 451	-89	10
1978	7 378	3	1 228	70	-6 150	- 4.5	16.6
1979	8 198	11	1 912	6	-6 286	- 2.2	23.3
1980	14 193	73	2 125	11	-12 078	-92.1	15
1981	20 834	47	2 165	2	-18 669	-54.5	10.4
1982	25 105	20.5	3 011	4	-22 093	-18.3	12
1983	25 194	0.3	6 289	108.8	-18 905	14.5	25

A - Crescimento em percentagem, em relação ao ano anterior. (7)

Fonte INE, in Boletim Informativo da Câmara de Comércio Luso-Japonesa (8)

Key:

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| 1. Year | 6. Amount |
| 2. Imports | 7. A: Percentage increase [or decrease] in relation to previous year. |
| 3. Exports | 8. Source: INE, in BOLETIM INFORMATIVO of Luso-Japanese Chamber of Commerce |
| 4. Balance | |
| 5. Coverage Rate | |

From January through May our trade deficit increased 9 percent in comparison with the same period of last year. The worsening of our trade balance is a consequence of extensive increases in imports and has resulted in a drop of about 3 percentage points in the coverage rate, which is now about 60 percent.

This change is contrary to the trend recorded since 1982. Between that year and 1983 the trade deficit declined 9.7 percent.

8834

CSO: 3542/77

EEC MEMBERSHIP: NATIONAL EVIL LACK OF INITIATIVE, NOT MONEY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 30 Jun 84 p 8

[Editorial: "EEC and Soccer"]

[Text] This week, French President Francois Mitterand traveled to Lisbon specifically to give "his friend" Soares the good news: "Portugal will definitely enter the EEC on 1 January 1986." It is the "terminus" of a long voyage, begun 9 years ago, at a time when the socialists--to prove to the nation and to the PCP the importance of their friendships--shouted "Europe is with us."

And the truth is that, for Mario Soares, membership in the EEC was always more a "political-risk insurance" than anything else. For the Portuguese prime minister, joining the European Community is justified above all by the fact that after consummation of integration in Europe the "South-Americanization of Portugal" will be difficult. In other words: after entry into EEC, Portuguese democracy will no longer live under the permanent specter of a military coup.

This, however, reflects on Mario Soares' part a state of mind.

At bottom, Soares knows that institutionalization of democracy in Portugal will not be an easy process. Mario Soares is seeking political insurance for the democratic regime because he is aware that politicians are not able (and probably will not be able in the next few years) to put the country in operation in such a way as to obtain the best of all insurance: a strong and prosperous economy.

This fact leads to a second question: to what point will entry into the EEC be able to contribute to modernizing the economic structures of Portuguese society?

Balsemao, for example, thought that it could.

During the time when he was prime minister, the ex-president of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] supported at various times the idea that the state of things in Portugal could be transformed only through an electric shock.

Balsemao believed that entry into the EEC would bring about such a shock--and would thus be beneficial. Of course, there are shocks that revive and shocks that kill; but this can only be verified after the experiment has been conducted.

Some time ago, Finance Minister Ernani Lopes justified the nation's entry into the EEC in another, more pragmatic way: it would bring into Portugal tens of millions of contos per year in the form of community loans.

It is another way of looking at the question.

But it should not be forgotten that Portugal's malady was never so much the lack of money as the lack of initiative and of structures.

Much money flowed into Portuguese territory--coming from the Orient, Brazil and Africa. The problem is that it entered and was spent--without leaving a trace. Portugal never did have the structures and the organization that would use the money and increase it, using it as a factor of progress. In Portugal it was not produced--it was consumed.

Having said that, the main point is made.

The Portuguese have a knack for improvisation--but not the temperament to get organized.

A good image of the country was given recently in France by the national soccer team: where the players, thanks to their playing skills, managed to conceal--and even overcome--disorganization, dissension and a complete lack of discipline off the field.

Let us see whether the EEC will make the Portuguese into more disciplined and organized beings.

Or whether it will only serve to prolong for a few more years spending above what is produced--increasing Portugal's dependency on the outside world.

8834

CSO: 3542/77

BRIEFS

EEC ASSISTANCE--The European Economic Community will grant Portugal a nonrepayable loan of about 1,711,000 contos for setting up 10 vocational-training centers and improving production conditions of dairies in the Beira Litoral region. The loan agreements, made within the framework of Portugal's pre-membership in the EEC, will be signed this afternoon in Brussels between the Commission of European Communities and the government. According to the projects submitted by the Portuguese Government, vocational-training centers will be set up in Braganca, Braga, Vila Real, Aveiro, Castelo Branco, Tomar, Portalegre, Santarem, Beja and Faro, which will lead to development of 4,500 vocational-training stations for adults, youth and the physically handicapped. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Jun 84 p 4] 8834

CSO: 3542/77

OECD EXPERTS HAIL ECONOMIC GROWTH, URGE STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Jun 84 p 14

[Text] The new economic program, introduced in Turkey after the change of government in December 1983, is the correct way to go toward restoring to health the ailing Turkish economy, in the judgment of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It embraces a somewhat stronger domestic and fiscal policy with the two-fold goal of alleviating the inflationary pressure and improving the balance of payments. But the main goal of the program allegedly is aimed at exposing the Turkish economy faster to the market forces and to international competition. "This is the important condition in order to achieve a healthy and permanent growth in a short time."

In the view of the OECD secretary's office, the start of a new recovery program became even more necessary when the 1983 economic results of Turkey were less satisfactory than expected. The rate of growth of the gross national products, which had exceeded 4 percent in the previous years, declined to nearly 3 percent mainly because of a lower agrarian production and a slower increase in exports. Domestic demand rose faster than production especially because of a strong increase in private consumption. Inflation, which had been dropping regularly in the past few years, has again increased and reached a temporary rate of 40 percent because of a relaxation in domestic and fiscal policies.

Long-term new growth requires considerable structural adaptation in the public sector and in the private economy. OECD welcomes the liberalization of foreign exchange regulations by Turkey. In essence, export is to be increased so that the export earnings would cover a larger part of the necessary imports and Turkey could attract more private capital from abroad for productive investments in the country. According to Turkish projections, the gross national product of the country, after the 3.3 percent in 1983, should increase by 4.7 percent this year; according to OECD estimates it should only go to 4 percent. In 1984, the year could close with a balance of trade deficit between 2.9 and 3.2 billion dollars in contrast to 3.5 billion dollars in 1983, and the balance of payments could close the year between 1.3 and 1.55 billion dollars in the red as opposed to 2.1 billion.

2473

CSO: 3620/343

TURKDOGAN ON 'SHANTY TOWN' SOCIOLOGY, SOLUTIONS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 26 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by Prof Dr Orhan Turkdogan]

[Text] One of the major areas of Turkish sociological research today is the population shift from the villages to the cities and the occurrence of urbanization, that is, the rapid increase of the number of persons living in cities.

Between 1960 and 1970 in our nation, the number of people living in villages fell from 73.7 percent of the total population to 64.1 percent while the number residing in cities rose by 9.6 percent within 10 years. As a natural consequence of this development, more than 2.6 million persons migrated from villages to cities during the same period.

When evaluating the results of the various studies that have been conducted, it is seen that the factors that play a significant role in this trend are: 1. the scarcity of land, 2. rapid population growth, 3. financial difficulties in earning a living, and 4. the younger generation's attraction to city life and life-styles.

Villager Consciousness

Originally, this phenomenon, which has occurred in the Turkish community within the past 20 years and which most researchers call the "death of the village" or the "ruralization of the cities," was, as related to rapid industrialization in some cities, the result of the inability of the land to sustain the increasing population and the ensuing "agricultural dissonance" within the structure of the community. In fact, application of modern technology in the agricultural sector was the cause for unemployment for large masses of villagers, and persons who, possessing insufficient amounts of land and having moved to the outskirts of the large cities or to impoverished regions, brought about the creation of shanty towns. In this way, this "cultural lag" which emerged in the agricultural structure because ties between the land and the people and social unity could not be ensured, gradually led to the desertion of the rural areas by the young and dynamic labor force and to the emergence of a new series of socioeconomic problems and of a "destitute culture" in the large cities. Still, the village culture and its values must never be eroded. It is imperative of a healthy society to preserve the village and to prevent its decline.

Even in contemporary technological societies in which distinctions between villages and cities have been reduced to a minimum, we witness that the "villager consciousness," which constitutes the source of solidarity, traditions, and the spirit of community, has not been expunged. When speaking of village-city differences, well-known village sociologists such as Sorokin and Zimmermann, calling attention to environmental and, particularly, occupational strata and cultural forms within the two institutions, have noted that with the typical villager there is a healthy family structure, a modest and simple life-style, and a grounded, sound character.¹

Wilhelm Ropke also defends the theses that a sound social structure supports the villager, that the villager class consists of a single community that has not yet been ruined, and that, for this reason, the villager class is the last refuge for persons who value modes of living that possess vitality and inner balance.²

In Soviet Russia, rapid industrialization was attempted initially by breaking up the villages, and the "villager consciousness" was destroyed. In recent years, however, "villager" qualities began to find their place in collectives and state farms. In particular, those who work on pieces of land that are not directed to the market and collective-farm workers who own private land parcels are termed "villagers." Under Article 7 of the Soviet constitution, private land parcels are those that supplement the basic income provided by collective farms. For this reason, more than 90 percent of the collective farms in Russia produced the potatoes, fruit, meat, eggs, and vegetables they consumed on their own private land in 1966.³

Creation of Shanty Towns

In our nation, rapid technological development and industrialization and the inability to ensure harmony or unity with the manifest forces of rural areas have brought about a situation resulting in a series of socioeconomic problems today. This is also the reason for the destruction of norms -- "anomie" in sociological terms -- or, in other words, the formation of shanty towns. It is seen that the inability of shanty towns, whose growth has continued since 1945, to assimilate into the cities in which they are located, from the standpoint of education, manner of living, and occupational change, separates them from the national culture by the development of a culture of deprivation peculiar to themselves. Therefore, if basic measures are not taken, delimitation of the moral cultural structure of the Turkish society could occur in time.

In a broad sense, the people's culture, with its folk tales, anecdotes, folk poetry, and various creative activities, becomes a dynamic force of the moral culture. Yet, in shanty towns, this understanding is incomplete, is abandoned instead for a form of biological drive toward "eliminating hunger," for example. For this reason, when unity with the national culture cannot, on one hand, be ensured a subculture created -- as a result of deprivation -- within a specific physical environment, cultural primitivism, on the other hand, could ensue. This situation is one of great importance to Turkish society, in which urbanization is taking place rapidly. Rapid industrialization and the land-labor imbalance can cause the "villager consciousness" to be transformed into a "culture of deprivation" by their effect on village-city unity. From this standpoint, it can be said that Turkish society cannot attain the healthy identity that is desired with the occurrence of both ruralization and urbanization and that there are two basic problems that demand national

solutions. In that case, the most important and necessary proposal is for the implementation of measures appropriate to the structure of the society in order to achieve unity among cultural elements.

The primary principle behind this change would be a development model directed toward tourism as well as manufacturing productivity appropriate to the labor force and the structure of the community and to the conditions of the village environment, namely, work involving the blacksmith, earthenware potter, millstone-quarry worker, hotelkeeper, butcher, florist, greenhouse worker, fisherman, canner, weaver, woodworker, and carver. Thus, those unable to find work in the agricultural sector or earn a living because of the scarcity of land would, in addition to farming half a day, be able to be employed in these types of organizations or businesses. Likewise, the elderly, wives, and youths would be able to do piecework in their homes for various organizations located in the villages. Development in southern Italy has been achieved through such enterprises carried out by Olivetti and similar industrial firms. In this manner, constructive opportunities ensured by industrial and commercial activities can, just as they can contribute to the agricultural development of the village and villager, prevent the social erosion of the cities that can also destroy the characteristics of rural areas.

FOOTNOTES

1. Orhan Turkdogan, "Turkiye'de Koy Sosyolojisinin Temel Meseleleri" [Basic Problems of Village Sociology in Turkey], Second Edition, 1978, pp 63-68.
2. Wilhelm Ropke, "Cagimizin Buhrani" [Contemporary Crisis], 1967, pp 206-207.
3. Ian Hill, "Some Problems of the Soviet Agricultural Categorization", Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 15, No 1, 1975.

11673

CSO: 3554/264

DONG GAS AGREEMENT REMAINS FIRM DESPITE PROTEST FROM LEFT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Jun 84 p 10

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen]

[Text] The attempt by SF (Socialist People's Party) to gain a political majority in favor of renegotiating gas rates is doomed to failure even before next Friday's meeting of the four parties SF, S (Social Democrats), R (Radical Liberals), and VS (Left Socialists) on this topic.

There is no reason to reopen negotiations on natural gas contracts between the state-owned company DONG (Dansk Olie og Naturgas) and Dansk Undergrunds Consortium (DUC) at present, according to the chairman of the board at DONG, Holger Lavesen.

Thus, it appears that a political storm against the gas contracts, led by SF, will certainly fail, even before next Friday's meeting on this topic involving SF, S, R, and VS.

The Social Democrats demanded a statement from DONG as a precondition for the discussions.

The statement was delivered by the chairman of the board, Holger Lavesen, yesterday. The statement rejected the idea of negotiations at the present time, but did not exclude the possibility of reopening negotiations at some later date.

The management of Dansk Olie og Naturgas A/S is now evaluating whether or not the two sides in the gas contracts--DUC and DONG--have any business interest in altering the terms of the contracts which, as we know, contains no clause on renegotiating terms.

"The company has concluded that this is not the case at the moment," Holger Lavesen said.

DONG's board chairman continued: "The gas contracts will be in effect for a long time, however, so obviously the possibility of altering the conditions of the contracts cannot be excluded."

"In this connection, it should be pointed out that DONG is involved in business

transactions in other areas with the companies that are included in DUC and that cooperation in other areas of business is a possibility," Holger Lavesen concluded.

Last Friday, in answer to SF's call for renegotiations--a call that also has been made by the Labor Movement's Business Council--Social Democratic Party chairman Anker Jorgensen said:

"I am not sure that this is the correct time to make this demand and I believe, in any case, that we must first hear from the commercial party involved in this matter, namely DONG."

9336

CSO: 3613/186

POLLUTION IN BALTIC CHANGING CHARACTER OF SEA LIFE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 6 Jun 84 p 9

[Article by Henrik Ekman]

[Text] Karlskrona--The character of animal life in the Baltic Sea is changing as a result of the overuse of fertilizer. Fish such as pike and perch are declining in numbers. Their place is being taken by bream and roach. Cod are thriving in the rich nutrients, but they will be endangered in the long run by the lack of oxygen.

Prof Bengt-Owe Jansson, head of the Ask Island Laboratory in the Sodermanland Archipelago, is in no doubt: human effluents lie behind several of the changes that he and other scientists have recorded in the Baltic.

Natural factors also play a big role. A greater inflow of North Sea water has increased salinity by 1 part per 1,000--enough to enable the stinging jellyfish to spread as far up as the Aland Sea and the blue jellyfish to reach as far as the northern part of the Gulf of Bothnia.

The 1-degree increase in the water's average temperature over the past 100 years, as noted in the Gotland Deep, is also a natural factor with important ecological consequences.

All the same, it is the continuing abundant addition of the nutrient nitrogen (1.2 million tons per year) and phosphorus that has played a decisive role, according to Bengt-Owe Jansson.

In his speech to the Baltic Sea Conference in Karlskrona on Tuesday, he emphasized the inland sea's diversified character. For example, phosphorus is the substance limiting the growth of vegetation in the southern part of the Gulf of Bothnia, while nitrogen is the limiting factor in the rest of the Baltic.

This is unfortunate, since we have been very successful in removing phosphorus from waste water, whereas a large percentage of the nitrogen continues to pass straight through the sewage treatment plants.

Expensive Treatment Method

The technology exists, said Uwe Schell of the Schleswig-Holstein state government, but it is still so expensive that getting it accepted is difficult.

There are no "dead" areas at the bottom of the Baltic. On the other hand, large areas have no oxygen--as much as 25 percent of the area, according to Finnish estimates. In that environment, which is dominated by hydrogen sulfide, no higher life can exist. But there are lots of bacteria.

Hydrogen sulfide will probably not spread any closer to the surface than the boundary between the fresher surface water and the saltier deep water. That boundary lies at a depth of about 65 meters.

But if it reaches that far, it will mean the end of cod as a propagating species in the Baltic. Cod eggs must float in water to hatch, and that requires salinity of between 10 and 11 parts per 1,000. Oxygen is also required. If the oxygen-poor water spreads as far up as the saltwater boundary, there will be no suitable space left for cod eggs.

Restoring Balance

One hope may be that under oxygen-free conditions, the nitrogen will convert more easily into nitrogen gas and disappear into the atmosphere above. Nature does have a certain ability to restore balance.

Bengt-Owe Jansson emphasizes: "Basically, we must decide what kind of Baltic we want. We already know enough to make a decision. If we wait until we have 100-percent knowledge, which I believe is impossible to achieve, it may be too late--if what we want is a clean Baltic with varied plant and animal life."

His colleague, Prof Sven L. Jansson of the University of Agriculture, said the same thing, but from a somewhat different perspective. He showed that the loss of nutrients is considerably greater in Malmohus County than in Varmland.

"Nitrogen losses are greater in a more productive system. This is inevitable. We must choose: shall we have agriculture in which food production is the most important thing, or do we prefer good-quality water?"

On the other hand, he emphasized that the leakage of plant nutrients does not have to be a problem if farmers fertilize optimally--that is, just enough to give the crops what they need.

Manure Is the Problem

The scientists seem quite unanimous in thinking that it is manure rather than artificial fertilizer that constitutes the big problem. It is easier to adjust the quantity of the latter, and with better information, there should not be any problem.

'INFOPOL' ANTI-POLLUTION TRAINING SEMINAR

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 2 Jun 84 p 21

[Article: "'Infopol' Session on Marine Pollution"]

[Text] Each year, since 1977, the French authorities organize a training seminar dealing with marine pollution caused by ships and sea installations, with emphasis on pollution due to hydrocarbons. Termed "INFOPOL," the course of instruction is organized by the different ministries concerned, with the participation of public organizations and companies in the trade sectors concerned.

"INFOPOL" aims to establish a synthesis and an overall perspective of the knowledge acquired and the thoughts aroused by the problems presented by pollution in the most varied areas: biology, oceanography, maritime law, or techniques in the prevention and cleanup of marine pollution.

France has experienced serious accidental pollution and chronic pollution just as harmful to the marine environment. French authorities have thus acquired a definite competence in this area. Thanks to "INFOPOL," a synthesis of the lessons learned from these experiences can be established and information is available on the efforts made in France in this area by both private and public sectors, "INFOPOL," moreover, provides opportunity for conference members or personnel from various places to confront ideas and experiences so that each person may deepen his thinking in this area.

From 14 to 25 May, the participants gathered information on the possibilities of existing methods, the precautions necessary for putting them into effect and the advisability of their use so as to be better prepared to fulfill their responsibilities. It is a source of contacts likely to lead subsequently to mutual assistance thanks to relationships established during the course of instruction.

The program of the eighth "INFOPOL" session covered three topics:

- 1) The prevention of marine pollution,
- 2) Marine pollution cleanup,
- 3) The consequences of marine pollution.

The topics are developed in the form of conferences and discussions with specialists from private companies or public services; film showings; studies of the files of concrete cases; visits to port and industrial installations and demonstrations of equipment.

After these conferences in Paris, conference members went to Brest and to Marseille. This course of instruction, for which a fee is charged, is open to the foreign staff of the maritime or port sectors (public or private) who have or will have responsibilities and decisionmaking authority in the matter of pollution (prevention and cleanup). These seminars have had a real success; the number of foreign candidates is 27 and 12 places are offered to French conference members. Among other places, the trainees come from the various states of the Mediterranean Basin, and the African and Gulf states.

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LACK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTION PREVENTS FOREST-SPRAYING HALT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Jun 84 p 7

[Article by Matts Dahlstrom]

[Text] Dalarna, Monday--Sixty of the country's 283 municipalities failed to announce in time whether they will permit or ban the chemical spraying of deciduous saplings in their forests.

What this means is that the forest companies can force the county forestry boards to give the go-ahead for spraying even though the municipalities want a total ban.

That is what DAGENS NYHETER was told by forester Soren Braf of the National Board of Forestry in Jonkoping.

"If the landowners stick to their guns, the county forestry boards can regard those 60 municipalities as having given their approval," said Soren Braf.

On Monday, the National Board of Forestry's latest figures were complete concerning local decisions on the chemical spraying of deciduous saplings in woodlands.

The municipalities were supposed to inform their respective forestry boards of their decision by 1 April of this year.

Too Late

By that date, 217 municipalities had responded to the county forestry boards, while 60 did not manage to do so before the summer break.

Six municipalities have no woodlands and are therefore not included in the figures.

Of the country's municipalities, 157 exercised their right to veto chemical control measures and announced a total ban on all methods.

Another 18 municipalities will allow either aerial or ground spraying (10 of them will go along with aerial spraying).

And 59 municipalities will allow selective methods in certain areas, meaning that the trees will have to be treated one by one using an agent such as Roundup, which does not contain phenoxy acids.

Motala is one of the 60 municipalities that failed to report in time, with the result that its "vote" was transformed from a "no" into a "yes" following action by the county forestry board in Linköping.

The result is that Ulf Riber's land will be sprayed with chemicals from helicopters this summer against the municipality's wishes.

Folke Andren, municipal manager of the municipality of Motala, told DAGENS NYHETER:

"We were not ready with our decision by 1 April because of reports and the presentation of initial proposals that we consider spraying in peripheral areas."

Following the county forestry board's go-ahead to the landowner, the politicians became obviously irritated, and they are now going to approve a total ban.

The municipality of Gävle also failed to report in time. Korsnas-Marma has applied to the county forestry board in Gävle for an exemption.

"We have not yet received a reply," says Åke Troedsson, Korsnas-Marma's chief forester in Gävle. "There is a danger that we will not be able to arrange for chemical spraying, since the year is so far along."

The county forestry board in Falun has not received a response from the municipal councils in Borlänge and Leksand, but it is accepting the bans decided on by their municipal administrations.

The administrative courts of appeal in Sundsvall, Jönköping, Göteborg, and Stockholm are currently hearing 55 appeals from the big forest companies against the total bans. The judgments will be delayed until after summer because the municipalities are still preparing their replies to those legal offensives by the forest companies.

The forest companies have protested what they see as excessive bureaucracy and delaying tactics by the municipalities that have banned spraying.

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